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LIST OF THE PARTIES TN THE COURT BELOW 
The following is a complete list of the parties in the proceeding before the Third 
Judicial Pistrict Court: 
JUDGE 
The HON KATE A. TOOMEY, Judge presiding, Third Judicial District Salt Lake 
Department. 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, Greg Anderson, pro se, represented by John McCoy in oral argument. 
2. Defendant, T. Richard Davis, represented by himself and Thomas Price. 
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District Court. The Memorandum Decision and Order was rendered by Judge Toomey. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to [Utah Code Ann §78-2-2(3)(j)] (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
( a) That the statute of limitations for written contracts in Utah is 6 
years, and it begins to run as soon as a person is capable of maintaining an action. 
8 
Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) Lipscomb v. Chilton 
793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 
(Utah App 1988) F.M.A. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80,404 P.2d 670, 673 
(1965). Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc. 114 P. 3d 602 (Utah App 2005) 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: The standard of review for when the statute of 
limitations expires is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness: Quick Safe-T 
Hitch, Inc v. RSB Sys. L.C 2000 Ut 84 If 10, 12 P. 3d 577; also see State v. Lusk 2001 UT 
I02,1f 11, 37, P.3d 1103. 
(b) That an acceleration clause in a written contract, at best would add 
one month to the six year statute of limitations in a written contract that has an 
optional acceleration clause. Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 
1983) Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. 
and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) F.M.A. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 
404 P.2d 670,673 (1965). 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: The standard of review for when the statute of 
limitations expires is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness: Quick Safe-T 
Hitch, Inc v. RSB Sys. L.C. 2000 Ut 84110,12 P. 3d 577; also see State v. Lusk 2001 UT 
102, 111, 37, P.3d 1103. 
( c) That if under Utah Law, an optional acceleration clause gives a 
beneficiary of a trust deed additional time beyond the six year period for contracts 
9 
in writing, that additional time would not apply to 3rd parties who have not formally 
assumed the liabilities of the trust deed note. Taylor Bros. Co. V. Duden et at. 
(Supreme Court of Utah Jan 27, 1948) 188 P.2d 995, See also Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 
203, 87 p 674; Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A., N.S, 898. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law; The standard of review for when the statute of 
limitations begins to accrue is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness: Quick 
Safe-THitch, Inc v. RSB Sys. L.C. 2000 Ut 84 ^ 10, 12 P. 3d 577; also see State v. Lush 
2001 UT 102,111, 37, P.3d 1103. 
(d) That a trustee has a duty to all people with a equity position in a 
property in which he has an official position as a trustee on a deed of trust. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Blodgettv. Martsch 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1978), Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1999 App), certiorari denied 994 P.2d 
1271. 
(e) That a Trustee has a duty to check the applicable law of the statute 
of limitations, before foreclosing on a persons property. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Blodgett v. Martsch 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1978), Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1999 App), certiorari denied 994 P.2d 
1271. 
(f) That a notice of default filed on an owners property where 8 Yi 
years have passed since the last payment was made, and that trustee was given 
10 
written notice that the notice of default does constitutes a wrongful lien; trustee is 
liable to the property owner for treble damages pursuant to Utah Code. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Blodgett v. Martsch 59u F.id 298 (III all 
1998), Winters w Schulma?u 077 I1 M I 'IXH'l.ili l"W \pp> iciliociii denial W P 'M 
12 71. 
(g) That defendant T. Richard has personal knowledge that the statute 
of limitations in the state of Utah for written contracts is six years, which includes 
contracts with acceleration clauses, inasmuch as he unsuccessfully litigated, 
- Jericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) a detailed statute of 
limitations case, in front of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Standard of Review: The Court accepts the factual allegations in fli e 
c o m pl a in t as true mil i ipifciinlii.ni J l i oasonable inferences to be drawn from those 
facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ramsey v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 
319,1fl,79P.3d423. 
(h) That judge Toomey erred by stating that: 
" I bus, as a vendee, the Plaintiff has standing to assert the same defense to 
the obligation that Carman, LLC could have asserted, but has no rights or 
defenses greater that the debtor merely by virtue of his status as a vendee." 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Taylor Bn,- Uuaen < * 
(Supreme Court of Utah Jan 11, it "H « I 15K \\ Jut llW\ * 
> *74; Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. ; i , , 26 L.R.A., N.S, 
11 
898. 
(i) Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
"In Utah, when an obligation is met by installment payments, the statute of 
limitations generally begins to run on each defaulted payment as they come 
due." 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 
P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) F.M.A. Fin Corp, v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80,404 P.2d 670,673 (1965) 
(j) Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
The court of appeals has since interpreted Johnson as adopting the rule used 
in the majority of jurisdictions on governing installment contracts. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 
P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) FMA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965) 
Judge Toomey used Nilsen Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern, 905 P.2d 312 
(Utah App. 1995) as her source for her above statement. Nilson Newey & Co. v. Utah 
Resources Intern., is a case where the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint on laches, 
and it was affirmed by the Court of appeals on that basis. In Nilson Newey, Plaintiffs lost, 
they did not win, so it could not have been adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
(k) Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
12 
"Although the Plaintiff argues that "It does not matter 
whether or not the contract is an installment contract or a contract 
with one payment," none of the cases he cited supports his 
assertion." 
Plaintiff cited: Fredericksen v.. Knight Land Corp., u<\ ' I" ,M 11 (I Huh 1M'K31 
HaiiililTs Reply Mu»n tilc-I Mny ? V "MIOT, pape c>) ;ilso see: Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 
P.2d 379 (Utah 1990), Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah 
App 1988), F.M.A. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 67* , * . - , . - ^ 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law, anu v-
ilur cDiiiplaiiii .is Iiiit.1 and considers all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ramsey v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, f 1 n° 
P.3d423. 
(1) judge Toomey
 c 1 it e d i i- hen she • stated: 
"Because the Plaintiff has not cited any case supporting his argument that 
"It does not matter whether or not the contract is an installment contract or a 
contract with one payment," the Court will apply the long-standing rule that 
causes of action generally accrue for each missed installment at the time the 
obligor defaults on that obligation, but does not accrue on future 
installments until the obligations on those installments are breached." 
Plaintiff cited: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983), 
(Plaintiffs Reply Memo filed May 23, 2007, page 5). See Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 
(1906) 203, 87 p 674; Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 Utar, \ 
the complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts 
13 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ramsey v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, f 1 , 79 
P.3d423. 
(m) Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
"the Court has not found a Utah case that directly considers the 
impact of an optional acceleration clause upon the accrual of a cause of 
action on an installment contract." 
Plaintiff pointed out Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) 
in District Court, a case which Defendant took to the Utah Supreme Court, and the case 
states that the statute of limitations accrues when a complete cause of action arises. The 
case also states that the courts may presume from the lapse of an unreasonable time that a 
demand was made and refused. Also see Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) 
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan 757 P.2d 483 (Utah app. 1988. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 
P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) F.MA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965) 
(n) Judge Toomey erred when she stated 
"Mr. Simmons forbearance should not be penalized by applying the statute 
of limitations to the date that Carman defaulted on its installments. The 
statute of limitations began to run from the date that the last part of Carman, 
LLC's performance was due, June 1,2006." 
In Utah an optional acceleration clause, may possible give a Beneficiary an extra 
month to foreclose, which plaintiff pointed out in District Court. See Fredericksen v. 
14 
KnightLandi 'M^>,. W»7 I* M M M Hsih I f»!U) a case which Defendant took to the Utah 
Supreme Court, and the case states that the statute of limitations accrues when a complete 
cause of action arises. Also see Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. 
Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan hi P.Jil iflf (1 Hah ap|i MW. •..:•-' ••,-
Standan ^Feview: Matter of Law: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 
(Utah 1983), Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990), Cooper v. Deseret Federal 
Sav, and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988), FMA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 1 7 Utah. 
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 6 - \ 
Sanctions: Defendant T. Richard Davis made several statements in his 
memorandums that he knew were untrue when they were made. The statements were 
made to defraud plaintiff, and to confuse the court. Defendant Davis as a trustee had a 
duty to plaintiff pursuant to, liludgvtt \ Mm .•< h '•">(» I' ,M 298 (Utah 1998). Defendant 
Davis had a duty to the court not to mislead the court pursuant to Rule 3.3. Candor 
Toward the Tribunal, Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, and Rule I I 
Truthful in Statements to Others. ( a) Make a false statement oi maix i 
(iiii'ii pusoh liuph'iiu I ourt Rules of Professional Practice . 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law* and a decision by the court as to the facts: 
U.C.A. § 25-5-1 (1953 as amended) Cady v. Johnson < d 149 Utah 198. ^ 
claim or claims must be (1) without menu (2J . . . i 
if I ill Impeachment: Defendant's memorandums should have been 
impeached pursuant to issues discussed above, and in this brief. Schocker v. Milton O. 
Bitner Co., 30 Utah 2d 173, 176, 514 P.2d 1290,1292 (1973) Utah R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). 
Standard of Review: a matter of fact to be tried by the trier of fact Cady v. Johnson 671 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) 
(q) Constructive Fraud 
The court should have found that Defendant Constructively Defrauded plaintiff 
Standard of Review:... constructive fraud is an equitable doctrine employed by 
the courts to rectify injury resulting from breach of obligations implicit in the relationship. 
Blodgett v. Martsch 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978), Blodgett further explained that 
"[ojbviously, a trust deed trustee may not . . . defraud a trustor." First Security Bank of 
Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing; 780P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989)" (page 108 footnote 4, Five 
F.9 LLC v. Heritage Savings Bank SI P.3d 105 (Utah App. 2003)) In Utah "every 
contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith/' Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 
49, 50 (Utah 1991). 
(r) Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Inasmuch as Defendant knew that he could not legally sell Plaintiffs property 
because he was rebuked by the Supreme Court and knew the statute of limitations law, he 
had a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, but chose to sell plaintiffs property to satisfy his personal 
ambition and greed. 
Standard of Review: Breach of Fiduciary Duty is a question for the trier of 
16 
Il ticI, unless ihe circumstances iii'c reason for a directed verdict. In Blodgett v. Martsch, 
590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978) Five R, LLC v. Heritage Savings Bank SI P.3d 105 
(Utah App. 2003) 
UEXERMINATIVE STATlITES and UVLES 
ii;;f } I I - 1 j, • * i Within n-Mesne profits of real property—Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2)upon any contract, obligate writing, except 
those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
§ 38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien—Damages: 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a 
wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or 
filed in the office of the county recorder against real property 
is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages 
proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) 
refuses to release or correct the wrongful lien within ten days 
from the date of written request from a record interest holder 
of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-
known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that 
record interest holder for $19000 or for treble actual damages, 
which ever is greater, and for reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real 
property for $3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is 
greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful 
lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county 
17 
recorder against the real property knowing or having reason to 
know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
§ 78-27-56 attorneys fees—Award where action or defense in bad faith—Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fee's to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought in good faith, 
Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees's because there is no question that defendants 
defense was brought in bad faith, and is without merit because of defendants rebuke by the 
Supreme Court in Fredricksen. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11. 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers, representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and 
other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in 
the attorney's name, or if the party is not represented by an 
attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state 
the signers address and telephone number, if any. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, 
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the 
signature is corrected promptly after being called to the 
attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representation to the court By presenting a pleading, 
written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, 
filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
18 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein 
are warranted by existing law or by a non frivolous argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law. 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery; 
(c) Sanctions. If after notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been 
violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, 
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible 
for the violation. 
[1] Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities. 
[1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and 
a public citizen having special responsibility to observe the law and the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, shall take the Attorneys Oath upon admission 
to the practice of law, and shall be subject to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline, 
and Disability. 
Attorney^ Oath 
I do solemnly swear that I will support, obey and defend the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah; and that I will 
discharge the duties of attorney and counselor at law as an officer of the 
courts of this State with honesty and fidelity, and that I will strictly observe 
the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah. 
Rule 3 1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions 
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A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing 
so that is not frivolous, 
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal. 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a)(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the lawyer, 
(a)(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the 
lawyers client or a witness called by the lawyer has offered material 
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer, shall take 
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary disclosure to the 
tribunal. 
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others. 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; . . . 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 601. General rule of competency. 
( c) (2) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this section if the statement 
was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness. 
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party 
calling the witness. 
Rule 608 Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown 
to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise 
adduced. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 10, 1996, Roy W. Simmons sold to Carman, LLC certain real 
property located at 136 East 2100 South in Salt Lake County, and received in connection 
with said sale a Trust Deed securing a debt in the amount of $59,500. Carman LLC and/or 
Carolyn Manning made payments, the last of which was made on July 15,1998. Appellant 
received his deed on the subject property via a Sheriffs deed, and was not a party to the 
original transaction between Carman LLC, and Roy W. Simmons. On November 8, 2006, 
Appellee filed a "Notice of Default" on Appellant's property. Appellee admits that on 
January 2,2007, Appellee received a letter from Appellant demanding that he remove the 
"Notice of "Default" with in twenty days or that, "an action would be filed against him for 
treble damages" pursuant to §38-9-1, Utah Code. Instead of acknowledging his duties to 
Plaintiff as a Trustee, Defendant T. Richard Davis caused to have written a "Scam 
Memorandum," which was faxed to Plaintiff, in an obvious attempt to defraud Plaintiff of 
his property. Plaintiff should have been granted summary judgment by the District Court 
as follows: (1) that Defendants "Notice of Default" constitutes "Slander of Title", is a 
"Wrongful Lien" pursuant to §38-9-4-(3), and (2) that Defendants actions amount to 
Constructive Fraud, (3) and that the statute of limitations in this action, is a six year statute 
that begin to accrue as to plaintiff, appellant in mid 1998, when the last payment was made 
by original trustor, as a matter of law. The fact of the matter is that there is a long-
standing rule in Utah, and that rule is, that the statute of limitations accrues at the moment 
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that a cause of action arises. 
Appellee argued in District Court that in Utah "Installment Contracts" are different, 
and that the statute of limitations begins to run on each installment as it becomes due. 
The statute makes no exception for installment contracts, which appellee knows inasmuch 
as he used the same argument in Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 
1983) in District Court, which he appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. {See Exhibit "F"} 
appellee's brief in the above case pages, 21, 22, and 23). Appellee's argument was 
soundly rejected by the Supreme Court which stated in the last paragraph of the decision: 
"Fredricksen raises additional arguments which we deem to be 
without merit" 
The opinion was written by the Honorable Justice Durham, and Hall, C.J. Stewart, 
Oaks, and Howe, JJ., concurred. 
Now, twenty plus years later Appellee has decided to use the same argument as a 
way to defraud Appellant of his property even though the exact same argument was used 
and rejected as being "without merit" by the Utah Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court 
of Appeals has since further expounded upon the issue of when the statute of limitations 
begins to run on a note and trust deed in Cooper v. Desert Federal Sav. And Loan 757 P.2d 
483 (Utah App. 1988). Finally, the case that most relates to this action is Taylor Bros. Co, 
v. Duden et at (Supreme Court of Utah Jan 27, 1948) 188 P.2d 995, 996. 
This action started as a simple statute of limitations case, but was so convoluted by 
defendant and the District Court ruling, that there now other issues all relating back to, or 
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contingent upon the ruling as to the statute of limitations. The issue of sanctions also is 
now a big issue. Judge Toomey ruled against Plaintiff on each and every issue. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about May 10,1996, Roy W. Simmons sold to Carman, LLC certain real 
property in Salt Lake County, Utah, located at 136 East 2100 South, and received in 
connection with said sale a Trust Deed securing a debt in the amount of $59,500.00. The 
Trust Deed was recorded with the Salt Lake County recorder on September 10, 1996. 
2. Carman L.L.C. made payments on the note until mid 1998. 
3. In about 1997 or 1998 the property was deeded from Carman L.L.C. to E. L. 
Whitehead. 
4. On or about March 23,2000, Plaintiff received a Judgment against E. L. 
Whitehead in the amount of $147,000.00 from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
5. On or about January 20, 2006, plaintiff received a Sheriffs Deed on the subject 
property, which was sold by the Sheriff, and purchased by plaintiff pursuant to plaintiffs 
judgment. 
6. On or about November 11,2006 Appellee T. Richard Davis filed a Notice of 
Default on Plaintiffs property, and claimed a total of $104,209.63 was still due on the 
note. 
7. On or about December 29,2006, plaintiff sent defendant a letter demanding that 
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he take the Notice of Default of plaintiff s property because it constituted a wrongful lien 
pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code, inasmuch as the note had been paid, and/or 
the statute of limitations had ran because more that eight and one half years had passed 
since the last payment had been made by the original mortgagor. (See Exhibit "A") 
8. On January 11,2007, Defendant wrote a letter to Plaintiff in which he stated: 
"Since mid 1998, however no payments have been made9'. When the last payment was 
made in "mid 1998", and Plaintiff believes is the day that the six year statute of limitations 
began to accrue pursuant to Utah Law. (Exhibit ("B") 
9. Defendant refused to take the unlawful lien off of plaintiff s property, and in 
February of 2007, unlawfully noticed plaintiffs property up for a Trustee's Sale. 
10. On March 20, 2007 Plaintiff faxed to defendant case law clearly showing that 
the statute of limitations had ran its course because plaintiff was not a party to the contract 
pursuant to Taylor Bros. Co. V. Duden et at (See Exhibit "C") 
11. On March 20,2007 T. Richard Davis sent plaintiff a memorandum that was for 
the purpose of defrauding plaintiff of his property, even though he had a duty to plaintiff 
because he was acting as plaintiffs trustee. The memorandum was authored by Nathan 
Scharton, an attorney in the firm of Callister, Nebeker, and McCullough. Inasmuch as the 
memorandum cited cases that had nothing to do with plaintiffs case, that memorandum 
was at all times characterized by plaintiff as a "scam memorandum" to put defendant and 
his attorney on notice that his case was without merit, and that he had no authority to be a 
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Trustee because the Statute of Limitations had ran. (Exhibit "D") 
12. On or about March 16, 2007 appellant filed this action against T. Richard 
Davis in Third District Court in Salt Lake City, and filed a lis pendens on the subject 
property. 
13. On or about the 13th day of April, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment against Defendant and Appellee T. Richard Davis. 
14. On or about the 27th day of April Defendants T. Richard Davis and Thomas B 
Price filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendants Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The documents purposely convoluted 
the facts pertaining to the action, and also the case law on at least three occasions 
pertaining to the action. None of the cases that defendants presented had anything to do 
with plaintiffs case, and their claims as to what their cases meant is without merit and 
presented in bad faith, which will be shown. 
15. On or about the 14 day of May, in order to get Defendants attention, Plaintiff 
sent to defendant a Motion and Memorandum for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. Rule 11 
precludes Plaintiff from filing the Motion and Memorandum with the court clerk for 21 
days. 
16. On or about the 21st day of May, Plaintiff filed a motion to impeach 
defendants' memorandums. 
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17. On May 14, Plaintiff faxed to Gary R. Howe, a partner in the law firm of 
Callister Nebeker and McCullough a letter in regarding Rules of Professional Conduct, 
and Specifically Rules 5.1, and 5.2 respectively, which is Responsibilities of Partners, 
Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers, and Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer. 
Plaintiff told Mr. Howe in the fax that he knew that Defendant T. Richard Davis knew the 
statute of limitations law. Mr Howe did not respond, or act pursuant to his responsibilities 
as defined by the Rules of Professional Conduct, as a senior partner in the firm of 
Callister, Nebeker, and McCullough. (Exhibit E) 
18. Plaintiff knew that defendant T. Richard Davis had personal knowledge of 
when the statute of limitations begins to accrue in the State of Utah, because he 
unsuccessfully litigated a case in the Utah Supreme Court that explained when the statute 
of limitations begins to accrue. He was soundly rebuked by the Supreme Court. The case 
was Fredrickensen v. Knight Land Corp 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983). This was one of the 
cases pointed out in plaintiff's memorandums in Third District Court, but Judge Kate A. 
Toomey disregarded all Utah Supreme Court precedent setting cases, and went all over the 
United States to find installment cases. 
19. In Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, plaintiff made the following 
statement: 
"12. The material facts are clear and not disputed in 
this case, and so the case is simply a matter of law with two 
legal questions before the court which are: (a) What is the 
statute of limitations in the State of Utah on a written 
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contract that a vendee is not party to, and; (b) Did 
Defendant overstep his bounds, and duty to Plaintiff by 
placing a "Notice of Default" on Plaintiff's property when 
the last payment to beneficiary was more that eight years 
prior." 
On page 6 of defendants opposition memorandum defendants purposely 
misstated plaintiffs memorandum by claiming plaintiff said: 
"(a) What is the statute of limitations in the state of Utah 
under writs and contract that a vendee is not party to, 
and;" 
20. After Plaintiff moved the court to impeach defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, defendant Defendant T. Richard Davis apologized to the court for the above 
mistake, but did not apologize for any of the other claims or misstatements of case law, 
and acted as though they never happened. Plaintiff believes that he can prove that the 
above statement by defendant, and his attorney was not a mistake, but a calculated 
misstatement in order to defraud plaintiff of his property. 
21. On page 9 of defendants opposition memorandum defendants purposely 
misstated plaintiffs memorandum by claiming plaintiff argued he had the same rights as 
the mortgagor, even though case law in the below case, and others, states he has superior 
rights to the original mortgagor. 
"Plaintiff argues that Tavlor Bros. Co. v. Duden et al. 
188 P. 2d 995 (Utah 1948) allows him the same rights as 
Carman, LLC, relative to the Note and assert the statute of 
limitations claim attempting to bar the foreclosure 
proceedings. Even if Taylor does allow Plaintiff the same 
rights as Carman, LLC, the Note became due on 01 June 2006, 
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and the applicable statute of limitations began as well." 
22. Plaintiff never made the above argument that Defendants claims he made in 
defendant's above statement. The statement is a misrepresentation of plaintiffs position, 
and was fabricated for the purpose of claiming that plaintiff did not have superior rights to 
the mortgagor as is stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the above case. Defendants never 
apologized to the court for the above statement even though it was pointed out by plaintiff 
in his motion to impeach defendants motions. Judge Toomey used a version of the above 
statement in her memorandum and decision. 
23. On the first paragraph of page nine of defendant's opposition to plaintiffs 
motion to impeach defendants Davis, and Price stated: 
"It cannot be disputed that the statute of limitations 
began on 01 June 2006 and Defendants actions to foreclose on 
the Property and conduct a trustee sale falls well within the 
applicable Statute of Limitations." 
The fact of the matter is that Taylor does dispute that the statute began in June of 
2006 as defendants claim pursuant to Plaintiffs superior rights as stated below. 
[1,2] This Court has held that such a vendee may plead 
the bar of the Statute of Limitations at the expiration of six 
years after the cause of action against the mortgagor has arisen. 
See Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 p 674; Boucofaki v. 
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165,104 P. 117,26 L.R.A., N.S, 898 
This is so because as stated in 34 Am.Jur. Page 294, Sec. 397: 
Plaintiff also countered as follows: 
Taylor is very clear in stating that a vendee may plead 
the bar of the Statute of Limitations at the expiration of six 
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years after the cause of action against the mortgagor has arisen. 
In Utah the statute of limitations begins to run at the time when 
a complete cause or right of action accrues or arises. Thus the 
period of limitations begins to run as soon as a right to institute 
a suit arises. Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 
(Utah 1983) Hill v. Alfred 2S P.3rd 1271 Utah (2001). 
24. T. Richard Davis as an attorney appealed Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 
667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) to the Utah Supreme Court, and was throughly rebuked. The 
case states that the statute of limitations accrues when a complete cause of action arises. 
25. In his brief in Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp, Mr. Davis used the same 
argument as he used in this action, that the statute of limitations begins to accrue on a 
installment contract on each installment as it becomes due, and was soundly rebuked by 
the Supreme Court. (Exhibit "F") 
26. The fact of the matter is that the Court of Appeals decided Nilson-Newey & 
Co. on the Doctrine of laches in favor of defendants, and not in favor of plaintiffs, the 
party who claimed Johnson was similar to their case. The Court of Appeals discussed the 
Johnson case, and rejected Johnson argument in the above case, and never adopted any 
such rule, and the claim that the Court of Appeals adopted the Johnson case was a total 
fabrication. The fact of the matter is that the accrual of the Statute of Limitations law in 
1904 is the same as it is today, which is, the statute begins to run when a action can be 
maintained. In Graves v. Seigfried, et al 87 P. 674, 677 (Utah 1906), with a note payable 
in installments, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
When the association was declared insolvent and a receiver 
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appointed to wind up its affairs, the mortgage became 
immediately due and collectible, and the receiver could have 
maintained an action for a recovery. The cause of action 
accrued at that time, and the statute then began to run The 
association was adjudged insolvent and a receiver appointed 
January 8, 1898. The action was commenced April 29, 1904, a 
period of time longer than six years. 
26. On or about August 21, 2007 plaintiff demanded from T. Richard Davis an 
accounting on plaintiffs property pursuant to defendant Judge Toomey's decision in the 
second paragraph of page 8 of the Judge's Order dated August 14, 2007. On or about 
August 22,2007, Defendant Thomas B Price sent a letter to Plaintiff refusing an 
accounting, and rejecting the judges declaratory findings, and even though they are not in 
accordance with Utah Law, nor did the declaratory findings give plaintiff the relief that he 
should have been granted in the first place. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. The statute of limitations for written contracts in the State of Utah is six 
years, and that it begins to run as soon as a person is capable of maintaining an 
action. 
THE REAL UTAH LAW CONCERNING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The statute of limitations in the state of Utah for written contracts reads as follows: 
§ 78-12-23. Within six years Mesne profits of real property—Instrument 
in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, 
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except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
It is noteworthy that the statute has the single exception of §78-12-22, and there is 
no exception for installment contracts in the statute as defendant claims. 
On page 8 Defendant stated in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities for his 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement he states: "Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the specifics of installment payments and when the statute of limitations begins. 
When contract obligations are payable by installments, 
the statute of limitations begins to run only with respect to 
each installment when it becomes due the contract is a 
continuing one during the life of the plaintiff, but maturing in 
installments of yearly payments. I t . . . may be enforced by 
proper action whenever and as often as an installment falls due 
and remains unpaid. 
In her Memorandum Decision and Order in regards to the above statement judge 
Toomey stated: 
The Court of Appeals has since interpreted Johnson as 
adopting the rule used in the majority of jurisdictions 
governing installment contracts. See Nilson-Newey and Co. v. 
Utah Resources InVl 905 P.2d 312, 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
The Fact of the matter is that the Court of Appeals in Nilson-Newey stated: With 
respect to plaintiffs claim for recovery of its share in any profits, plaintiff argues that this 
case is like Johnson v. Johnson 31 Utah 408, 88P. 230 (Utah 1906) and then stated: 
Thus on the facts before the trial court, there is no basis for 
applying the rule set forth in Johnson. 
Page317 
Nilson- Newey was decided by the Court of Appeals in favor of defendant on the 
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defense of laches. (See Footnote 1). Inasmuch as the case was decided by laches in favor 
of defendant, it therefore seems a bit strange that the court adopted plaintiffs argument as 
Judge Toomey claims. 
The Court of Appeals actually did rule on mortgages with acceleration clauses in 
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan, 757 P.2d 483 (Utah App. 1988) where it stated: 
The prevailing rule is that under an ordinary 
acceleration clause in a mortgage or trust deed, the obligee has 
a reasonable time after the default or the event which gives rise 
to the right to accelerate in which to elect to declare the 
indebtedness due. Accordingly, where . . . no definite time is 
specified by which the election to accelerate must be 
exercised, such election to do so must be exercised within a 
reasonable time Of course, each case must be considered 
on its own facts, and certainly, an election to accelerate a year 
or years in the future,... could not be considered reasonable 
under ordinary circumstances. 
In Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) the court stated: 
Unless a delay in making a demand in expressly 
contemplated by the parties, the courts may presume from the 
lapse of an unreasonable time that a demand was made and 
refused. 
Defendant Richard Davis was an attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellant in Fredricksen 
and used the same argument in his brief in that case, that: "Installment sales are treated 
uniquely by statutes of limitations" (See Brief of Appellant Case No. 18131, pages 21-23, 
Exhibit "F") The Utah Supreme Court soundly rebuked his argument by simply stating: 
Fredricksen raises additional arguments which we deem to be without merit. 
Page 38. 
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Also see, Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) FMA. Fin Corp, v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80,404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965). 
An acceleration clause in a written contract, at best would add one month to 
the six year statute of limitations in a written contract that has an optional 
acceleration clause. In Fredericksen the court went on to say 
. . . . However, when a provision in a contract requires an act 
to be performed without specifying the time, the law implies 
that it is to be done within a reasonable time under the 
circumstances; and in case of controversay, that is something 
for the trial court to determine." Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 
Utah, 621 P.2d 1240, (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
In Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) the 
court stated: 
There are ample facts in the record to support the trial 
courts conclusion that Desert's failure to enforce the due on 
sale option for more than four years after it learned of the sale 
is unreasonable. See Malouff, 509 P.2d at 1246 (one month is 
reasonable, but not one year). Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's conclusion. 
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If under Utah Law, an optional acceleration clause gives a beneficiary of a 
trust deed additional time beyond the six year period for contracts in writing, that 
additional time would not apply to 3rd parties who have not formally assumed the 
liabilities of the trust deed note. In Taylor Bros, Co, v Duden et al the Supreme Court 
of Utah Stated: 
This court has held that such a vendee may plead the bar 
of the Statute of Limitations at the expiration of six years. 
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After the cause of action against the mortgagor has arisen. See 
Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 P.674 and Boucofaki v. 
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165,104 P. 117,26 L.R.A,N.S. 898. In 
those cases it was held that the statute of limitations inured to 
the benefit of a third party who was not a party to the contract 
even though the mortgagor had waived or could not avail 
himself of that defense. This is so because as stated in 34 Am 
Jur. Page 294, Sec. 379. 
Taylor Bros. Co. V. Duden et at (Supreme Court of Utah Jan 27, 1948) 188 P.2d 995. 
A trustee has a special duty to all people with a equity position in a property in 
which he has an official position as a trustee pursuant to a deed of trust. 
In Blodgett v. Martsch 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) regarding a trustee's sale the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
[5] The duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater 
than the mere obligation to sell pledged property in accordance 
with the default provision of the trust deed instrument, it is a 
duty to treat the trusted fairly in accordance with a high 
punctilio of honor. In discussing the difference between the 
duties of a mortgagee and the trustee under a trust deed, the 
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia in Spruill v. Ballard, 
61 App D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517, made this statement: 
The practice of securing money by deed of trust on real estate 
is the nearly universal method in effect in the District of 
Columbia. The ease and facility of foreclosure under it 
commends it over the more cumbersome form of mortgage 
which must be foreclosed in court, but this very fact imposes 
upon courts the duty of scrutinizing all sales had under it 
which are questioned, and of setting those aside in which fraud 
or overreaching has been practiced by the trustee. In Church 
Inv. V. Holmes, 60 App. D.C. 27,46 F.2d 608, we said a 
trustee named in a deed of trust to secure a loan sustains a 
fiduciary relation to the debtor as well as the creditor. 
[6] The breach of duty by the dominant party in a 
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confidential relationship may be regarded as constructive 
fraud. It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show an intent to 
defraud; constructive fraud is an equitable doctrine employed 
by the courts to rectify injury resulting from breach of 
obligations implicit in the relationship. 
[7] Finally, 'there is room for inference that trust 
companies, if they use the trust deed mechanism with no intent 
to be protective of borrowers, exploit the euphoria engendered 
by the word "trust" The statues permits only entities with 
credentials of trustworthiness to act as "trustees," (footnote 
omitted) and the instrument of transfer is denominated a 
"trust" deed. It may not be generally understood by those who 
convey by trust deed that the only entity to which the trustee 
feels fiduciary obligation is itself, 
page 302 & 304 
In this action, defendant T. Richard Davis is a prime example of a trustee who is 
unprotective of borrowers, (namely, plaintiff, appellant) and exploited the euphoria 
engendered by the word "trust", but went way beyond exploiting, by defrauding plaintiff-
appellant o I. his properly uiM i'» argument Ihsul lie hud soundh It1*'! IMI" ^redricksen. 
Defendant would have the court believe that if he complied with the outline by the 
legislature that he has no other liability concerning the foreclosure of trust deeds. 
However the Utah Court of Appeals has a very different outlook.., .mil -»( lul 
I hus, we are not convinced that the applicable standard 
has been established in Utah "as a matter of law/' 
Accordingly, the standard must be established factually in the 
course of ultimate resolution of this case, with a emphasis on 
standard-of-care-in-the-industry evidence. 
(Althoughthe footnotes are very detailed ,is lo legislate ml< mil, and standard (if care,, 
they have been omitted) 
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A Trustee has a duty to check the applicable law of the statute of limitations, 
before foreclosing on a persons property. 
In this action, defendant T. Richard Davis placed a notice of default on plaintiffs 
property and fraudulently foreclosed on the property, all the time knowing that he had no 
right to do so because of his being rejected by the Supreme Court of Utah in Fredricksen. 
Therefore, there was absolutely no question in Defendant's mind that the statutes of 
limitations had long ago ran in regards to plaintiffs property, In Wycalis v. Guardian Title 
of Utah 780 P.2d 821, a trustee filed a notarized reconveyance, acknowledged by a notary 
who was either duped or corrupted (p. 822) The request for reconveyance was 
accompanied by a letter that was also forged. Even though defendant had nothing to do 
with the notarization of the document the Utah Court of appeals granted a trial for plaintiff 
in order to decide the issue of whether or not defendant exercised an appropriate standard 
of care. In . Blodgett v. Martsch 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1998) the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated: 
The duty of the trustee, under a trust deed is greater 
than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in 
accordance with the default provisions of the trust deed 
instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in 
accordance with a high punctilio of honor. 
It is not honorable for a trustee to place a notice of default on a persons property 
when he has personal knowledge that the statute of limitations has ran and that he has no 
right to sell the property. The fact of the matter is that under Utah law a trustee pursuant 
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to a Deed of TrusI., is the ledum ill owner < >f tin: properly Win, in the statute of limitations 
] ias aecii icd, he no longer has any claim to the property. In Five F, LLC v. Heritage 
Savings Bank 81 P. 3d 105 (Utah App 2003) "The trial court found that Heritage owed 
Five F a fiduciary duty by assuming the roie oi Dotn 'trustee and beneficiary" (page 10 7) 
The court 'lumt i n lu slalr ninii ;i IMISUT owes a fiduciary duty to a trustor as was 
explained in First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banherry Crossing; 780P.2d 1253 (Utah 
1989) (3) w<iwhere the trustee stands in a dominate position to the trustor." Defendant I\ 
Richard knew that his argument involving installment contracts was v » ithout mei it be cat ise 
pursued that argument in the District Court. 
The fact is that Defendant was in a dominate position to Plaintiff because he refused to 
disclose the true law to Plaintiff. Plaintiff became aware of Defendants Brief in 
Fredericksen v. Knight Land torp,, I>I> mi 'u s I \i iiiiiiiiii il'iH i^ lifter tlic" Diutt'iii I'ouri 
Me morandi iiii and Order, however with Defendant being in a dominate position, he had a 
fiduciary duty to disclose the real law to Plaintiff. Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1999 App), certiorari denied 994 P.2d 1271. 
WRONGFUL LIEN 
A "notice of default" filed on an owners property where 8 Vi years have passed 
since the last payment was made, and that trustee was given written notice that the 
"notice of default constitutes a wrongful lien:" t r i l st e e j s [ia^, 
all damages for trebled pursuant to Utah Code. 
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Blodgett v. Martsch 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1998), Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1999 App), certiorari denied 994 P.2d 1271. 
In Utah, '"[tjrust deed9 means a deed . . . conveying real 
property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the trustor of other person named in the deed to a 
beneficiary." Utah Code Ann. §57-1-19-19(3) (2000). Five F, 
L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank 81 P.3d 105 (Utah App. 
2000). 
In order to be a trustee in Utah, the Trustee must be the technical owner of the 
property, as mentioned above. However, a purported Trustee is not a trustee at all 
after the statute of limitations has ran, because he owns nothing nor can anything be 
transferred to him by a beneficiary who owns nothing because the statute of 
limitations has ran, therefore the beneficiary has no equity, and therefore has 
nothing to sell. T. Richard Davis has personal knowledge that the statute of limitations in 
the State of Utah for written contracts is six years, which includes contracts with 
acceleration clauses, inasmuch as he unsuccessMly litigated, Fredericksen v. Knight Land 
Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983), a detailed statute of limitations case, in front of the Utah 
Supreme Court. (See Exhibit "F") Therefore, defendant had no legal right to place a 
notice of default on plaintiffs property, and no right to sell plaintiffs property. The 
notice of default on plaintiffs property constitutes a wrongful lien, because the statute of 
limitations had ran about two and a half prior to him becoming the purported trustee. In 
Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997) "purchasers notice of 
interest in entire 38 acre tract of land could be considered "groundless," under statute 
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authorizing damages a vnnl dt^iiiisl party w ho ^loundlessly claims an interest in document 
filed in office of county recorder." By virtue of Defendants Notice of Default, he claimed 
an interest in Plaintiffs property, when he had none, and he knew it, because of his rebuke 
by the Supreme Court in F redricksen, which constitutes niali., •  IJI RILSSC!"" i ' homo* 9^9 
3 To file a Notice of Interest under 
section 57-9-4, the person must minimally "claim [ ] to have an interest in land" Id § 57-9-
4(1) (1994) Plaintiff is entitled to treble damages in the minimal amount of $ 1,440,000 
together with costs and attorney's fees. 
Judge Toomey erred by stating that: 
"Thus, as a vendee, the Plaintiff has standing to assert 
the same defense to the obligation that Carman, LLC could 
have asserted, but has no rights or defenses greater that the 
debtor merely by virtue of his status as a vendee." 
Page 6 footnote 4 Memorandum,. Decision and Order. 
Taylor Bros. Co. V. Duden et at. (Supreme Court of Utah Jan 27, 1948) 188 P.2d 
995, 996. See also Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 p 674; Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 
Utah 165,104 P. i i /, ;.:<> L.K., \„ MM, wm. 
Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
"In Utah, when an obligation is met by installment 
payments, the statute of limitations generally begins to run on 
each defaulted payment as they come due." 
Page 7, Memorandum Decision and Order. 
. ^ Uii ^ses to back up the above statement. And admitted so 
when she stated. " the Court has not found a Utah case that directly considers the 
39 
impact of an optional acceleration clause upon the accrual of a cause of action on an 
installment contract." Plaintiff cited: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 
(Utah 1983) Also see, Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) FMA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 
Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965) The fact of the matter is that Judge Toomey was 
unable to find a case that considers the impact of an optional acceleration clause in 
conjunction with an installment contract is because it is not the law, so it makes sense that 
she could not find such a thing. An optional acceleration clause gives a person at best up 
to one month to make a decision before the statute of limitations begins to run, unless 
special circumstances are involved. 
Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
The court of appeals has since interpreted Johnson as 
adopting the rule used in the majority of jurisdictions on 
governing installment contracts. 
Page 8, Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Plaintiff cited: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) also 
see : Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. and 
Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) FMA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 
P.2d 670, 673 (1965) 
Judge Toomey used Nilsen Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern, 905 P.2d 312 
(Utah App. 1995) as her source for her above statement. Nilson Newey & Co. v. Utah 
Resources Intern., is a case where the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint on laches, 
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j j ^ n , that basis. In Nikon Newey, Plaintiffs lost, 
they did not win, so it could not have been adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
"'Although the plaintiff argues that "It does not matter 
whether or not the contract is an installment contract or a 
contract with one payment/' none of the cases he cited 
supports his assertion." 
Page 10 Memorandum Decision and Order 
Plaintiff cited: Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) also 
see: Lipscomb v. Chilton 'lM >* ]d t ' i | i Htth i n n | i | f \tttpcr | f)esert>1 ^rhrttf utl 
2d. 483 (Utah App 1988), FMA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 
P.2d 670, 673 (1965). 
Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
"Because the Plaintiff has not cited any case supporting 
his argument that "It does not matter whether or not the 
contract is an installment contract or a contract with one 
payment," the Court will apply the long-standing rule that 
causes of action generally accrue for each missed installment 
at the time the obligor defaults on that obligation, but does not 
accrue on future installments until the obligations on those 
installments are breached." 
p&jie Memorandum Decision and Order 
The long standing rule in Utah is that the statute of limitations begins to accrue, "at 
the moment that a cause of action arises" Fredericksen i\ kmyjn Lana L-orp., 667 Il„zii H 
(Utah I «W I) (page 36), Fmrllh 'more, (In Nupiniu, i ' minii rebuked T, Richard Davis's 
argument in his brief in Fredricksen by stating; "Fredrickensen raises additional arguments 
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which we deem to be without merit." Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah (1906) 203, 87 p 674 
shows that the Supreme Court had the same position in 1906 in a mortgage foreclosure 
which states "Section 2875 provides that an action upon any contract; obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument of writing shall be brought within six years." In 
Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165,104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A., N.S, 898. (Utah 1909) the 
Supreme Court stated:.. the statute of limitations in favor of the junior claimant begins to 
run from the time the right of action against the original debtor accrued;.. (page 122, 123) 
Judge Toomey erred when she stated: 
"the Court has not found a Utah case that directly considers the 
impact of an optional acceleration clause upon the accrual of a cause 
of action on an installment contract." 
(Page 13 Memorandum Decision and Order.) 
The reason that the court could not find a case in Utah that considers the impact of 
an optional acceleration clause upon the accrual of a cause of action on an installment 
contract is because it is not Utah law, and therefore would obviously not exist. Plaintiff 
pointed out in, Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) (page 34, 36) 
in District Court, a case which Defendant took to the Utah Supreme Court, that the case 
states that the statute of limitations accrues when a complete cause of action arises. The 
case also states that the courts may presume from the lapse of an unreasonable time that a 
demand was made and refused (page 38). Also see Lipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1990) Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan 757 P.2d 483 (Utah app. 1988). 
FMA. Fin Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965) 
42 
Judge Toomey erred when s h ; si ate d 
"Mr. Simmons forbearance should not be penalized by applying the 
statute of limitations to the date that Carman defaulted on its installments. 
The statute of limitations began to run from the date that the last part of 
Carman, LLC's performance was due, June 1, 2006." 
(Page 17, 18 Memorandum Decision and Order.) 
•... In i ilali iiiiii i if» (ii i HI mi „i I! .ii'i'i'leratioii clause, iitiav possible give a Benciiciary an extra 
month to foreclose, which plaintiff pointed out in District Court. See Fredericksen v. 
Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) a case which Defendant took to the Utah 
Supreme Court, and the case states that the stauu-.. • imitations accrues u 'hen a complete 
ipscomb v. Chilton 793 P.2d 379 (Utah 1990) Cooper v. 
Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan 757 P.2d 483 (Utah app. 1988. FMA. Fin Corp, v. 
Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 (1965), 
Sanctions: 
Defendant T. Richard Davis made several statements in his memorandums that he 
knew were untrue when they were made. See "Relevant Facts", 19-26) The statements 
were made to defraud plaintiff, and to confuse the court. Defendant Davis as a trustee had 
a duty to plair. Q^R OJtah 1998) Defendant 
Davis had a duty to the court not to mislead the court pursuant to Rule 3.3. Candor Toward 
the Tribunal, Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, and Rule 4.1. Truthful in 
Statements to Others. (a) Make a false statement of materia! » •;. 
. . Suprvmc ('ourt Rules of Professional Practice. Because of Defendant's argument in 
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Fredricksen where he was rebuked by the Utah Supreme Court he knew that he had no 
legal or moral right to make the same argument again, and should be sanctioned. His 
claims as to the statute of limitations are (1) without merit, (2) and lacking in good faith. 
Because of being rebuked there is no way that he could have an honest belief in his claims 
that the statute of limitations begins to run with each installment missed. Because of being 
rebuked by the Supreme Court it is obvious that he fully intended to defraud plaintiff of 
his property. Furthermore there is no question that he knew that his frivolous and without 
merit arguments would hinder, delay and defraud plaintiff, and constitutes bad faith. In 
Cady v. Johnson 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) the Supreme Court stated: 
In addition to finding the claim to lack merit, the trail court must also 
find that plaintiffs conduct in bring suit was lacking in good faith. In 
Tacoma Assoc. Of credit Men v. Lester, 72, Wash 2d. 453,458,433 
P.2d 901, 904 (1967, the court defined "good faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 
question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of 
others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will, [sicj hinder dely or defraud others. 
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove that one 
or more of these factors is lacking. Sparkman and McLean 
Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 588 (1971) 
Although Sanctions were not evoked in Cady, the Court of Appeals in Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor 770 P. 2d 163 (Utah App. 1989) stated: 
Further consideration of Cady v. Johnson 671 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1983), highlights the importance of the amendment to 
Rule 11. See also note 10 supra. In Cady, which arose prior to 
the amendment, the trial court awarded fees pursuant to Utah 
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Code Ann. §78-27-56, which provides for attorney fees where 
an action is without merit and "not brought in good faith." 
The Supreme Court agreed that the claim had "no legal basis", 
and therefore was "without merit." 671 P.2d at 151. The 
Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the trial court's view 
that a lack of good faith had been established "because had 
plaintiffs researched the issue as instructed at pre-trial 
conference, they would have discovered they had no valid 
c la im. . . . " id. At 152. The supreme Court held that such 
"conduct does not rise to lack of good faith." id., which it 
defined in terms of purely subjective intentions, id at 151. 
Had amended Rule 11 applied in Cady, the analysis would no 
doubt have been different and the imposition of a fee sanction 
affirmed instead of reversed. Very simply, counsel's failure to 
research the validity of his clients's claim meant counsel had 
not made "reasonable inquiry" into whether the claim was 
"warranted by existing law." Utah RXiv.P. 11. 
(Footnote 10) 
11. Rule 40(a) is to this court what Rule 11 is to the trial 
courts. Both rules require attorneys and parties to reasonably 
inquire as to the facts and law before a document is signed and 
filed. Rule 40(a) is substantially similar to Rule 11 and 
• provides in parti 
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or the party has read the motion, 
brief, or other paper; that to the best of the attorney's or the 
party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after 
reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law. . . . If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed 
in violation of this rule, the cour t . . . . Shall impose . . . an 
appropriate sanction, which may include it reasonable 
attorney fee. 
(Footnote 11) 
ii is clear liiiil Defendant I Mi li.iiiil w iiillil IM< n luvn '.imctionnl under either the 
old Rule the amended rule, because he knew the law on the statute of limitations 
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because of his rebuke by the Utah Supreme Court in regards to his brief in Fredricksen v. 
Knight Land Corporation. (See Exhibit "F" Defendants brief in Fredricksen) 
On May 14, Plaintiff faxed to Gary R. Howe, a partner in the law firm of Callister, 
Nebeker, and McCullough a letter in regarding Rules of Professional Conduct, and 
Specifically Rules 5.1, and 5.2 respectively, which is Responsibilities of Partners, 
Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers, and Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer. 
Plaintiff told Mr. Howe in the fax that he knew that defendant T. Richard Davis knew the 
statute of limitations law. (See Exhibit "E"). Therefore the law firm of Callister, Nebeker, 
and McCullough should also be sanctioned. Finally Nathan Scharton, the person who 
wrote the "Scam Memorandum", should also be sanctioned inasmuch as the memorandum 
cited cases that had nothing to do with plaintiffs case, and the "scam memorandum" was 
the beginning of the conspiracy to defraud plaintiff. The "Scam Memorandum" was also 
without merit, because it also claimed that the statute of Limitations began to accrue on an 
installment contract with each installment, which is in violation of the Professional Rules 
i 
of Conduct. Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of 
law. See e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1538. If a Rule 11 violation is 
shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated, and we will affirm the particular sanction 
imposed by the trial court, including the reasonableness of any fee award., absent an abuse 
of discretion. Id. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor 770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989) 
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IMPEACHMENT 
Defendant's memorandums should have been impeached pursuant to prior issues 
discussed above, of purposely manufacturing facts, and misstating what the case law said. 
In Miller v. Archer 749 i J tah App. 1988) the court *r r 
ilcL'rniiuiiig flu! Ilii: avcipt w\ $5,000 recited in real estate option agreement was not true 
consideration for option trial court could consider parol evidence to disclose the true 
meaning of provisions in the agreement." Also see Schocker v. Milto: ,, Bitner c,- . r ) 
Utah 2d 1 , , ; . „ . , ^ , K, livid Kill if ^ -. v. 
to- > s 149 (Utah 1983) Taylor v. Estate of Taylor 770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 
1989). 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
"" TheBanbeny < Wm-i/in aiiiiiirl t iiimJ B/ \dgett I it n ts " Y \9 590 P 2d 298, 302 (Utah. 
1978), to explain that "[ojbviously, a trust deed trustee may n o t . . . defraud a trustor." 
First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing; 780P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989)" (page 
108 footnote 4, Five F '., L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bat
 t - ) 
; subject to an implied covenant of good faith/' Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 50 (Utah 1991) ." Forcing Plaintiff to defend the title to his 
property for over a year by a Trustee, when the Trustee knew the law because of his 
rebuke by the Supreme Cnurl \4 Utah is ttb vimisl\ ('onslrudivr Fraud The fact of the 
matter is that defendant T. Richard Davis just claimed to be a trustee, but in reality was not 
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because the statute of limitations had ran.. In Blodgett the Court stated: 
[6] The breach of duty by the dominate party in a 
confidential relationship may be regarded as constructive 
fraud. It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show an intent to 
defraud; constructive fraud is an equitable doctrine employed 
by the courts to rectify injury resulting from the breach of the 
obligations implicit in the relationship. 
Page 302 
It is obvious that Defendant constructively defrauded Plaintiff. 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Inasmuch as Defendant knew that he could not legally sell Plaintiffs property 
because he was rebuked by the Supreme Court and knew the statute of limitations law, he 
had a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Breach of Fiduciary Duty is a question for the trier of 
fact, unless the circumstances are reason for a directed verdict. Five F., LLC. v. Heritage 
Savings Bank 81 P.3d 105 (Utah App. 2003) The court found that Defendant had a 
fiduciary to Plaintiff, by assuming the role of both trustee and beneficiary. In this case, 
Defendant knew that he had no right to sell Plaintiffs property because he was rebuked by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Fredricksen, thereby breaching the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Also see Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Even though the Court of Appeals rejected the argument of plaintiff Nilsen-
Newey, in regards to the "installment nature of the contract". Defendant T. Richard 
Davis and Judge Toomey used Nilsen-Newey as a springboard as a way for defendant 
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to take his defense of this action out of the Utah statute c f limitations case law 
using Nilsen-Newey at s at springboard, Defendant side stepped the Utah appellant 
court case law rulings, which enabled the use of out of Utah jurisdictional cases to 
support of Defendant's claims thereby defrauding Plaintiff of his property. This all 
rebuke by the Utah Supreme Court mFredricksen. There is not a brief that Defendant 
can write concerning the statute of limitations, in defense of his claims in District Court 
that the statute accrues with each installment; because of his brief in Fredricksen, and 
rebuke by the Utah Supren additional mandatory 
sanctions pursuant to R Utah Ct App. 40a. (See Defendants losing brief in Fredricksen 
Exhibit "F"). Because the statute of limitations has ran in this action Defendant's Notice 
of Default is a Wrongful lien, because neither defendant or the purported beneficiary has 
iiii s iiiittTtsi in tilt tMiipciil », i(„i | l)e I co <J in 11 know s ill ii? i iii Wrongful lien because of his 
rebuke by the Utah Supreme Court in Fredricksen; (b) is groundless because neither 
Defendant or the purported Beneficiary has any interest in the property, (c) the Notice of 
Default contains a material false statement whic I i i". "N< IIIKIC I Il Dctiiiiill ri PhnntiiT never 
defaulted on an> provision of the original trust deed note, because he purchased the 
property via a sheriffs deed after the statute of limitations had ran. Plaintiffs purchase 
date was July 12, 2005. July 12, 2005 is three days short of seven years, when Defendant 
^ ^
 w a s ^ J a s t ^ .^^ an^ p d y m c r | | s WCR, | U a i j , „,,„,„ limn J,,, , ,|UI|^ I ( | r S ( j | ( | , ( r l()|| 
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limitations is six years, thus, plaintiff should be awarded treble damages because 
defendant refused to remove the unlawful lien from plaintiffs property. 
CONCLUSION 
In the State of Utah the statute of limitations accrues when a complete cause of 
action arises. The statute of limitations for written contracts including installment 
contracts is six years. The Notice of Default by Defendant constitutes a Wrongful lien 
because it was filed more than eight years after the statute of limitations began to accrue. 
Inasmuch as Defendant failed to remove the lien within twenty days after receiving notice, 
and actually sold Plaintiffs property, Plaintiff is entitled to treble damages as a matter of 
law. As a trustee pursuant to a Trust Deed, Defendant had a special obligation to Plaintiff. 
Because of Defendants misstatements, the "scam memorandum", and his rebuke by the 
Utah Supreme Court, it is clear that Defendant was dead set on defrauding Plaintiff of his 
property. Therefore, Defendant must be sanctioned. Because Nathan Scharton authored 
the "scam memorandum" he should also be sanctioned. Because Gary Howe refused to 
intervene after plaintiff faxed him a notice that as a senior partner, he had duty to Plaintiff 
pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, he should be sanctioned. Because 
Defendant T. Richard Davis and Gary Howe are senior partners, in the law firm of 
Callister, Nebeker, and McCullough, and that law firm should also be sanctioned pursuant 
to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Because Plaintiff was unable to sell his property 
because of the Wrongful Lien by Defendant he was damaged in the amount of at least 
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$480,000.00 trebled, plus costs anil .illoii iicys Ices iMamlitVis t i i t i t lal U > Ilirec t imes that 
i;iiill mi unit pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statute. The court should find that Defendant 
"constructively defrauded P l a in t i f f of his property, and Plaintiff should also be awarded 
punit ive damages pursuant to the egregious nature of Defendants actions. 
Dated this ^ 7 ' ? d,i> of Nnvrmbei '.'007 
GkegAnderson 
Note : Plaintiff, Greg Anderson believes it is highly likely that the Memorandum 
Decision and Order in this action signed by Judge Toomey was for the most part authored 
by defendant T. Richard Davis , and his attorney, Thomas Price, There are many factors 
that point in that direction. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Greg Anderson hereby certify that on November 26,2007, that I served two 
copies of the attached Appellants Brief upon the party listed below by mailing it by 
first class mail to the following address: 
T. Richard Davis 
Gateway Tower East Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Dated this 26th day of November 2007 
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FROM THE DESK OF GREG ANDERSON 
Route 3, Box 8049 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: 435 725-0048 
December 8,2006 
T. Richard Davis 
Zions bank Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City Utah 
RE: Notice of Default dated November 1,2006 - Roy Simmons 
Dear Mr. Davis: 
Please be advised that the Notice of Default mat you filed on November 6,2006 
on Lots 17, and 18 Hollywood Tract constitutes a wrongful lien pursuant to Title 
§ 38-9-1 Utah Code (Wrongful Liens.), in that the promissory note has been paid 
and/or the six year statute of limitations for written agreements has ran years ago. 
Therefore if you do not remove the unlawful lien within 20 days an action will be 
filed against you in Thu*d District Court for Wrongful Lien, together with other 
causes of action. 
I am the legal owner of the property, and it was given to Dan Kitchen for a loan, 
and I hereby demand, an accounting, and a copy of the Trust Deed Note. 
Govern Yourself Accordingly 
5g Anderson 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
C^yUBTERNEBEKER & McCWXOUGH 
Zions Bank Building, 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
ATTN: T. Richard Davis 
9902030 
11/8/2006 8:43:00 AM $16,00 
Book - 9377 Pg - 6496-6498 
GaryW. Ott 
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT 
OLD REPUBLIC TITLE 
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 3 P. 
Tax Identification No. 16-19-106-008 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that T. RICHARD DAVIS is Successor Trustee under that 
certain Trust Deed With Assignment of Rents dated May 10,1996, executed by CARMAN LLC, 
as Trustor, to secure certain obligations in favor of ROY W. SIMMONS, as Beneficiary, and 
recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, StateofUtah,onSeptember 10,1996, as Entry 
No. 6452338, in Book 7486, beginning at Page 1597 (the "Trust Deed"). 
The Trust Deed encumbers certain real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
which real property is more particularly described in as follows (the "Property"). 
See ExhibitA attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The obligations secured by the Trust Deed include a Trust Deed Note dated May 10,1996, 
executed by Trustor in the original principal amount of $59,500.00 (the "Note"). 
Notice is also hereby given that a breach of the obligations for which the trust property was 
conveyed as security has occurred, inthat the Note matured on July 31,2006, and as of November 
1,2006, principal and interest m the amount of $104,209.63, had not been paid. Taxes for the years 
1996 through 2005 are also delinquent 
In order to cure the default, Trustor must pay the above amounts together with any and all 
payments which hereafter become due and payable, including interest, late charges, trustee's and 
attorneys fees, costs and expenses actually incurred 
That by reason of said default, T. Richard Davis, Successor Trustee, has declared and does 
hereby declare all sums secured by the Trust Deed immediately due and payable and has elected and 
479417J 
does hereby elect to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby. Hie 
default is subject to reinstatement in accordance with the statutes of the State of Utah. 




Zions Bank Building 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake CSty, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7421 
Business Hours: 8:30 aum. to 5:00 pan 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this _/ November, 2006, by 
T.TQehard Davis, Successor Trustee. 
EXHIBIT A 
That certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
AD of Lot 17 and 18, Block 1, HOLLYWOOD TRACT. 
TOGETHER WITH and subject to aright-of-way over the following 
described tract: 
COMMENCING 10 feet South and 5 feet East of the Northwest 
comer of Lot 17, Block 1, HOLLYWOOD TRACT and running 
thence South 140 feet; thence East 9 feet; thence North 140 feet; 
feence West 9 feet to place of BEGINNING. 
4W417J 
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
GATEWAY TOWER EAST SUITE 900 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84133 
TELEPHONE 801-530-7300 
FAX 801-364-9127 
T. Richard Davis 
January 11,2007 
Mr. Greg Anderson 
Route 3, Box 8049 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
Re: Notice of Default dated November 1,2006 - Roy Simmons 
Dear Mr. Anderson: 
Your letter dated December 8,2006, was apparently not post-marked until December 28,2006 
and failed to arrive in my office until January 2,2007. Since my receipt of your letter, I have reviewed 
my client's loan file as well as the wrongful lien statute you cite in your letter. 
According to our foreclosure report issued by Old Republic Title Company of Utah, your interest 
in the subject property is merely that of a judgment lien creditor having obtained a judgment against E.L. 
Whitehead on or about March 23,2000 in the amount of $147,000.00. The report shows Mr. Daniel W. 
Kitchen as the fee title owner of the property, having received title by Warranty Deed dated February 14, 
2006. The predecessor in interest to my client, The Estate of Roy W. Simmons, loaned $59,500.00 to 
Carman LLC on or about May 10, 1996. The obligation to repay that loan was evidenced by a Trust 
Deed Note dated May 10,1996, executed by Caroline Manning, Manager of Carman LLC and secured 
by a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents of the same date which is the instrument referred to in the 
Notice of Default. Because you are not the original obligor of the Promissory Note, you may not 
understand that the Promissory Note was an installment obligation, the first payment of which was due 
on July 1,1996 and the final balloon payment was due on June 1,2006. Over the first three years of the 
loan term, some but not all of the loan payments were made. At no time was the principal balance ever 
reduced below $49,000.00. Since mid-1998, however, no payments have been made. And, the 
outstanding balance was required to be paid on July 31,2006. I have enclosed a copy of the Promissory 
Note and the Trust Deed for your review. 
Your understanding of the effect of the statute of limitations and the Utah Wrongful Lien statute 
upon Trust Deed foreclosures is, unfortunately, in error. I would strongly encourage you to obtain 
qualified legal counsel to instruct you in these areas. Undoubtedly, you will thereupon be informed that 
because the Promissory Note continued to have instalment payment obligations through July of 2006, 
the statute of limitations will not barr the pending foreclosure of the Trust Deed. Further, because the 
Notice of Default does nothing more than accurately declare a default in the repayment obligation 
TO CONTACT WRITER DIRECTLY 
(801)530-7421 
trdavis@cnmlaw com 




secured by a properly filed Trust Deed, neither the Trust Deed nor the Notice of Default constitute a 
wrongful lien under the Utah Code. 
Should you or your legal counsel desire further to discuss this matter, do not hesitate to call me at 
this office. 
Very truly yours, 
CALLISTERNEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
TRDrjr 
Enclosures 
cc: Mr, Harris Simmons 
T. Richard Davi; 
482286 1 
FROM THE DESK OF GREG ANDERSON 
DATE: March 20, 2007 
TO: T. Richard Davis 
Fax: (801)364-9127 
FROM: Greg Anderson Phone: 435 021-6762 
Fax: (435) 725-0048 
RE: Property at 136 East 2100 South 
Dear Richard: 
In Your Letter Dated January 11, 200 7, second paragraph, you have stated that no 
payments were made since mid 1998 which is approximately 8 1/2 years since the last 
payment, from Carman L.L.C. The property was then transferred to E. L. Whitehead, 
then in 2006 to Two Street, Inc., then to Dan Kitchen as security for a loan, and then to 
me. 
Under Utah law when a vendee has not assumed the obligation, the statute of 
limitations expires 6 years after the cause of action has arisen. See Taylor Bros. Co. 
V. Duden et at (Supreme Court of Utah Jan 27,1948) 188 P.2d 995, See also Greves 
v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 p 674; Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165,104 P. 117, 26 
L.R.A., N.S, 898. Taylor Bros. Co. V. Duden et al. 
The court stated: In those cases it was held that the statute of limitations 
inured to the benefit of a third party who was not a party to the contract even 
though the mortgagor had waved or could not avail himself of that defense. 
In this case, if no payments were made since mid 1998, that is when the 6 year statute 
begin to run. The 6 year statute would have expired in Mid 2004. If the property would 
have remained in the name of Carman L.L.C, the statute may not have ran. 




TO: Rick Davis 
FROM:': Nathan Scharton 
DATE: March 20, 2007 
RE: Applicability of 6 Year Statute of Limitations to Installment Contracts 
As requested, I have researched the following issue: 
Does the 6 year statute of limitations provided in Utah Code 78-11-2} hoyin nimiin^ 
anew from each missed payment in an installment contract? 
Yes. As a general statement, a party's failure to make an installment payment as 
promised is a breach of contract, and a cause of action for recovery of that particular 
installment accrues immediately. Thus, in the case of an obligation payable by 
installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it 
becomes due. See Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 231 P. 123 (1924). See also Lund 
v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (1997) (subsequent authority to Buell, changing the rule that the 
statute of limitations is tolled during a party's absence from the jurisdiction); And see 
Moab National Bank v. Keystone-Wallace Resources, 517 P.2d 1020 (1973) (holding that 
a statute of limitations begins running upon the failure to pay each installment). 
It has been suggested that when a vendee assumes an obligation, that statute of 
limitations expires 6 years after the cause of action has arisen. While it is generally true 
that a third party purchaser may take advantage of a statute of limitations argument 
otherwise available to the original obligor, this does not change the fact that the statute of 
limitations only begins running when the obligation accrues. The cases cited by Greg 
Anderson only relate to the general rule that the statute can inure to the benefit of a third 
party, they do not change the rules regarding when the statute begins running. 
FROM THE DESK OF GREG ANDERSON 
DATE: May 14,2007 
TO: Gary R. Howe 
Fax: (801)364-9127 
PR OM: Greg A ndersoi i Phone: 435 621 6 762 
Fax: (435)725-0048 
RE: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AND SPECIFICALLY RULES 5.1. 
and 5.2 respectively, Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory 
Lawyers; and Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer. 
Dear Mr. Howe: 
I am faxing you a copy of the Memorandum in Support of Motion to sanctions that 
I have forwarded to T. Richard Davis by first class mail. I think the document speaks for 
its self.. 
I tried to reason with Mr. Davis concerning this matter, but all he wanted to talk 
about is that he been to the Supreme Court of Utah on the Statute of Limitations, and that 
he knows the law on the statute of limitations. However, I am sure he knows the statute 
of limitations in this matter is 6 years, beginning in mid 1998.. 
At any rate, I thought it only fair that I apprise your firm of the situation, in case 
you are not familiar with the action because I plan on taking this matter to the bar counsel 
in the next few days. If you have any questions or suggestions, you can reach me on my 
cell phone at 435 621-6762, or FAX me at the above number. 
Sincerely, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBEF-*1 S. FREDERICKSEN, aka 
ROBERT S. FREDERICKSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KNIGHT LAND CORPORATION, 
a C o r p o r a t i o n , 
R e s p o n d e n t . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18131 
I . NATURE OF THE CASE 
T h i s i s an a c t i o n b y A p p e l l a n t on a w r i t t e n agi e e m e n t m a d e 
b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s w h e r e b y , f o r c o m p e n s a t o r r e c e i v e d , 
R e s p o n d on i. , K n i ' i h i " L a n d C o r p o r a t i o n , p r • v i • •? : - • •» :o 
Appel lan t , Robert F rede r i cksen , the sum of % 
thereon o r , at A p p e l l a n t ' s op t i on , convex i- ir; s u f f i c i e n t 
acreage of co i to in p roper ty known as Jeremy Ranch at a r a t e of 
$85.00 per acre to sa t i s fy said payment obligal 
I I . DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Coi i r t , Honorable Pete. = r, 
entered judgment of "no cause of action'1 against Appellant on al1 
claims set forth in his Complaint based on a Stipulated Statement 
of Facts and various legal memoranda submitted by the par t i e s . 
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I l l , NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A p p e l l a n t a s k s t h i s C o u r t t o r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t of t h e 
D i s t r i c t Court and to remand for e n t e r i n g of judgment i n favor of 
A p p e l l a n t p u r s u a n t to t h e c l a i m s in h i s C o m p l a i n t . 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or a b o u t t h e 1 s t d a y of N o v e m b e r , 1 9 6 1 , R e s p o n d e n t , 
Knight Land C o r p o r a t i o n , as b u y e r , e n t e r e d i n t o an a g r e e m e n t wi th 
E a s t S a l t Lake I n v e s t m e n t Company (ESLIC) , a s s e l l e r , w h e r e b y 
Respondent was g i v e n t h e o p t i o n to p u r c h a s e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 16,500 
a c r e s of l a n d known a s t h e J e r e m y Ranch (R. 2 3 1 ) . P u r s u a n t t o 
s a i d a g r e e m e n t , Respondent took p o s s e s s i o n of t h e e n t i r e Jeremy 
Ranch p r o p e r t y , r e c e i v e d t h e r i g h t t o p u r c h a s e s a i d p r o p e r t y for 
$1 ,400 ,000 .00 , and agreed to make annua l i n s t a l l m e n t payments to 
ESLIC t o w a r d s a t i s f a c t i o n of s a i d p u r c h a s e p r i c e (R. 2 3 1 , 2 4 4 -
2 6 4 ) . H o w e v e r , R e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t h o l d nor c o u l d i t d e l i v e r 
t i t l e t o any of t h e p r o p e r t y t o any o t h e r p a r t y u n t i l money was 
r e c e i v e d by ESLIC s u f f i c i e n t to r e l e a s e a p o r t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y 
(R. 5 9 ) . 
Sometime p r i o r to t h e 3 1 s t day of December, 1963, A p p e l l a n t 
c o n t r i b u t e d $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o and became a l i m i t e d p a r t n e r i n a 
p a r t n e r s h i p known a s H u n t i n g t o n P a r k I n v e s - t m e n t Company. Sa id 
p a r t n e r s h i p e n t e r e d i n t o an a g r e e m e n t w i th Respondent whereby the 
P a r t n e r s h i p would make t h e downpayment on R e s p o n d e n t ' s c o n t r a c t 
w i t h ESLIC and pay by i n s t a l l m e n t s c e r t a i n sums t o Respondent as 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r c o n v e y a n c e from R e s p o n d e n t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
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5,000 a c r e s of J e r e m y Ranch . A f t e r mak ing t h e r e q u i r e d down 
p a y m e n t , t h e P a r t n e r s h i p d e f a u l t e d i n i t s ay i: ^  eJII e n l ^ J r h 
Respondent (R. 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 ) / 
On the 3 1 s t day of December, 1963 , Respondent e n t e r e d i n t o a 
w r i t t e n A g r e e m e n t w i t h A p p e l l a n t and o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e 
P a r t n e r s h i p by the t e r m s of which A p p e l l a n t agreed to r e l e a s e h i s 
i n t e r e s t iii and t o t h e J e r e m y Ranch p r o p e r t y , and R e s p o n d e n t 
a g r e e d t o pay t o Appe 1 I a n I. (. h e s u in o I ) I 0 ,1)0 0 . 0 0 I < i g e I h e r w i l\ b 
10% t h e r e o n (R. 2 3 3 ) . A c o p y of s a i d A g r e e m e n t was r e c e i v e d in 
e v i d e n c e , a t t a c h e d t o t h e S t i p u l a t i o n of F a c t s (R, 2 7 6 - 2 8 5 K 
S a i d A g r e e m e n t p i: c / I d e s , I n t e £_ j ^ jL a,: T h a t A p I -»e L I . .* \\t 11 a > .1 
" i n d i v i d u a l l y " p a i d t o R e s p o n d e n t $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 ; t h a t R e s p o n d e n t 
p r o m i s e d t<) r e p a y t h a t sum t o g e t h e r w i t h 10% t h e r e o n from "50 
p e r c e n t of t h e gi:oss p r o f i t s a c t u a 1 ] y r ea 1 ized fay Kn:ii g h t froin 11: Ie 
r e s a l e of l a n d s a c q u i r e d by K n i g h t from t h e J e r e m y Ranch" ; t h a t 
" a l l sums r e c e i v e d b K n i g h t from t h e r e s a l e of any of t h e J e r e m y 
Ranch 1 an< :i i i i exce : $85.00 pei: aci:e sha 1 ] be c o n s i d e r e d t :> I : » c ; 
g r o s s p r o f i t s 1 1 ; t h a t A p p e l l a n t acknowledged f a m i l i a r i t y w i th the 
t e r m s of R e s p o n d e n t ' s c o n t r a c t w i t h ESLIC b e c a u s e of wh ich 
Appe ] ] ai I t ' s 3 : i g 1 I t t( ) r e payin ei I t w a s c ond :i t io i Ied upo n th e pa ym e n t s 
to ESLIC being kept current allowing the release resellable 
land to Respondent; that if all sums had not been advanced by 
Respond ent b;;: - Ji i] y ] ] 9 6 9 Appe 11 ant "may request Kn : '>'- \ to 
convey . , sufficient of the acreage theretofore released to 
Knight • : t the rate of $85, ~ - acre to satisfy and 
disc h a r g e a n y r e m a i :n i r i g i i n p a I d b a 1 a r•• • ' -. a t a n y breaching 
party thereto should pay all court costs and a reasonable 
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a t t o r n e y ' s fee incurred for enforcement of the agreement (R. 276-
285) , S e c t i o n s 1, 2, 3, 8, 16) . 
Between t h e 31s t day of December, 1963 and the 8 th day of 
May, 1 9 7 0 , t h e r e were a number of s a l e s of t h e l a n d by 
Responden t , a l l of which were for more than $85.00 per a c r e . 
Said s a l e s were n e c e s s i t a t e d by the annual payments due under the 
ESLIC agreement. Each yea r , only so much proper ty was re leased 
and so ld as would p r o v i d e Respondent w i th s u f f i c i e n t funds to 
meet t h e annua l o b l i g a t i o n . Al l p r o c e e d s from the s a id s a l e s 
were comple te ly exhausted by cos t s of s a l e s or in s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
t h e ESLIC o b l i g a t i o n (R. 239) . In f a c t , t h e r e were no p r o c e e d s 
received by the Respondent from any of these s a l e s which were not 
r e q u i r e d by ESLIC as a c o n d i t i o n to t h e r e l e a s e of t he sold 
p r o p e r t y . In each i n s t a n c e of s a l e , t he deed e i t h e r went 
d i r e c t l y from ESLIC to the t h i r d - p a r t y buyer or was t r a n s f e r r e d 
through Respondent immediately to the t h i r d - p a r t y buyer, and the 
money s i m i l a r l y was t r a n s f e r r e d e i t h e r d i r e c t l y from said buyer 
to ESLIC, or through Respondent immediately to ESLIC. Respondent 
did not ever have c o n t r o l of t he p r o c e e d s of s a i d s a l e s , nor 
could i t d e l i v e r t i t l e to t h e r e l e a s e d p r o p e r t i e s to A p p e l l a n t 
(R. 59, 236). 
On the 8 th day of May, 1970, Respondent e n t e r e d i n t o a 
w r i t t e n agreement with Emigration Land Company (Emigration) by 
t he t e r m s of which Respondent so ld on c o n t r a c t a l l of i t s 
i n t e r e s t in Jeremy Ranch for t h e sum of $2 ,100 ,000 .00 . The 
r e m a i n i n g a c r e a g e was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12,500 a c r e s . P u r s u a n t to 
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t h a t a g r e e m e n t , R e s p o n d e n t r e c e i v e d t h e sum of $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 a s 
downpayment on or about t h e d a t e of e x e c u t i on of t h e c o n t r a c t and 
p a y m e n t s of $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 i n 1971 and 1 9 7 2 . In 1 9 7 3 , R e s p o n d e n t 
d i s c o u n t e d t h e b a l a n c e of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e which was t h e r e u p o n 
p a i d .-<> t u n \,R. 2 3 7 - 2 3 8 ) . 
^ r e c e i p t of t he $500,000.00 downpayment from E m i g r a t i o n 
p u r s u a n t •••••; the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d ag reemen t of s a l e , Respondei uau, 
f o r t h e -• •*-- c i m e , mote p r o c * " - av ho 
15S L r. *' on ' be o p t i o n o b l i g a t i o n -, •-. Howeve , i , s u b j e c t 
Agreement w i th A p p e l l a n t a l l owed Respondent to " e*-=i\ - %~ * 
$85. ^0 per ?.cr - : **. -.«. «a<jii saxe D; «'.• -
be ^ . • S e c t i o n 2 ( c ) ) . Ap,: _ n • * - o .JnI y - : 
p a i d p e r c e n t of t h e g r o s s p r o f i t s * ~ e a r h s i ? 
F u r t h e r m o r e , Responent had no t i t l e 
Oct ' . r • i :Ii t i m e E m i g r a t i o . r a n s f e i .-• ; - j * < .> . ^ 
Respondent s e t t l e m e n t of t h e c o n t r a c t b a l a n c e <, '"-^ 
N e i t h e r A p p e l l a n t nor any o t h e r pa re 
r e c e i v e d .- mms of HIOI ie;- •-. anv land from Respondent p u r s u a n t 
t o t h e s u b j e c t A g r e e m e n t p r i o r t o t h e y e a r 1-7 . "-. 19 4,, 
p a r a g r a p h l ( x ) ) . In 1 9 7 4 , f o r m e r p a r t n e r s of Apt '" : .  w» 
p a r t i e s to the rtubje< : t Agreeinent,. were pa id c e r t a i n sums of money 
and g i v e n l a n d by R e s p o n d e n t fo r s e t t l e m e n t of a c i v i l a c t i o n 
f i l e d by t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s ;>n the s u b j e c t Agreement (R. 233 -234, 
p a r a g r a p h . Appel I . a t a s s e r t e d b e f o r e t h e C o u r t h e r e i n 
t h a t p r i o r \.. s a i d s e t t l e m e n t , he had b e e n e n c o u r a g e d by 
R e s p o n d e n t ' s a g e n t , J a m e s L. K n i g h t , n o t t o become a p a r 
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t h a t l a w s u i t and was v e r b a l l y a s s u r e d t h a t he would be pa id (R, 
332) . 
Af te r numerous a t t e m p t s to r e c e i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n of the 
c o n t r a c t u a l debt and subsequent to a period of convalescing from 
a s e v e r e h e a r t a t t a c k , A p p e l l a n t caused a w r i t t e n demand to be 
served upon Respondent on the 7th day of February, 1978. A copy 
of s a i d demand was r e c e i v e d in e v i d e n c e , a t t a c h e d t o t h e 
S t i p u l a t i o n of F a c t s (R. 324-327) . In s a id demand, A p p e l l a n t 
exerc i sed h i s c o n t r a c t u a l opt ion to reques t payment in the form 
of l and as p rov ided in t he s u b j e c t Agreement (R. 4 1 , p a r a g r a p h 
20) . A p p e l l a n t a t a l l t i m e s per formed a l l of the s t i p u l a t i o n s , 
c o n d i t i o n s , and agreements s t a t e d in the subjec t Agreement in the 
manner t h e r e i n spec i f i ed . However, Respondent refused e i t h e r to 
pay the sum of $10,000.00 toge ther with 10% thereon or to convey 
to Appellant s u f f i c i e n t acreage to d ischarge the indebtedness . 
On the 20th day of March, 1978, Appellant f i l ed t h i s ac t ion 
in t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Cour t in and for Summit County 
aga in s t Respondent praying for conveyance of p rope r ty , or in the 
a l t e r n a t i v e , for repayment of t h e $10,000.00 p l u s 10% t h e r e o n . 
P u r s u a n t to s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l , a j o i n t 
S t i p u l a t i o n of F a c t s was s u b m i t t e d to the Court (R. 231-327) 
followed by va r ious memoranda of law and argument. The p a r t i e s 
a g r e e d t o d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t J a m e s L. Kn igh t 
i n d i v i d u a l l y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Honorable P e t e r F. Leary , 
awarded Respondent a judgment of "no cause of a c t i o n " a g a i n s t 
A p p e l l a n t on a l l c a u s e s of a c t i o n s e t f o r t h in h i s Compla in t , 
f i n d i n g t h a t s a i d " c l a i m s a r e b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of 
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l i m i t a t i o n s " (R. 387 -388 , 391-396) . A p p e l l a n t a p p e a l s from s a i d 
j u d g m e n t . 
V- ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT'S CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE PROPERTY FROM RES-
PONDENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
S e c t i o n 3 of t h e s u b j e c t Agreement b e g i n s : 
I f Knight has no t r e imbursed each of t h e P a r t i e s of 
t h e F i r s t P a r t in f u l l for a l l sums advanced by him 
as a f o r e s a i d , p l u s 10 p e r c e n t , by J u l y 1 , 1968, each 
or any of t h e P a r t i e s of t h e F i r s t P a r t may r e q u e s t 
Knight t o r econvey to s a i d r e q u e s t i n g p a r t y s u f f i c i e n t 
of the a c r e a g e t h e r e t o f o r e r e l e a s e d t o Knight from 
t h e Jeremy Ranch, a t the r a t e of $85.00 per a c r e t o 
f u l l y s a t i s f y and d i s c h a r g e any remain ing unpaid b a l a n c e 
t o s a i d r e q u e s t i n g p a r t y . 
I t d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , s t i p u l a t e a s t o when t h i s e l e c t i o n 
should t a k e p l a c e . When a p r o v i s i o n in a c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e s t h a t 
an a c t be per formed w i t h o u t s p e c i f y i n g any t i m e , Utah law i m p l i e s 
t h a t i t i s t o b e d o n e w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e u n d e r t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . B r a d f o r d v . A l v e y & S o n s , 621 P.2d 1 2 4 0 , 1242 
(Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . 
A " r e a s o n a b l e t i m e " i s d e f i n e d a s "so much t i m e a s i s 
n e c e s s a r y , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t o do c o n v e n i e n t l y wha t t h e 
c o n t r a c t or d u t y r e q u i r e s h o u l d be done i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . " 
Commercial S e c u r i t y Bank v. J o h n s o n , 10 Utah 342, 173 P.2d 277, 
281 ( 1 9 4 6 ) . The o n l y c o n t r a c t u a l r e q u i r e m e n t s fo r A p p e l l a n t ' s 
e x e r c i s e was t h a t he be not f u l l y r e i m b u r s e d by Respondent b e f o r e 
J u l y 1 , 1 9 6 8 , and t h a t he c h o o s e a c r e a g e f r o m p r o p e r t y 
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t h e r e t o f o r e r e l e a s e d . Thus, t h e o p t i o n came i n t o e x i s t e n c e on 
t h a t d a t e . 
As s t i p u l a t e d and a d m i t t e d by Respondent , any a t t e m p t e d 
e x e r c i s e by Appellant of the opt ion p r io r to October, 1974 would 
have been u n d i s p u t e d l y f u t i l e . Although t i t l e may have on 
o c c a s i o n t e c h n i c a l l y passed th rough Responden t , i t had no 
a l i e n a b l e t i t l e to the p roper ty which i t could give P l a i n t i f f (R. 
2 3 5 , p a r a g r a p h 6 ( b ) ) . In May, 1 9 7 0 , R e s p o n d e n t became a 
b e n e f i c i a r y t o a T r u s t Deed execu ted for the p u r c h a s e of the 
p roper ty by Emigration (R. 238, paragraph 11). Respondent s t i l l 
had no l e g a l t i t l e to the p r o p e r t y such as cou ld be t r a n s f e r r e d 
to Appel lant in l i e u of i n s t a l l m e n t payments. The f i r s t da te to 
which Respondent a d m i t s h o l d i n g c l e a r t i t l e to any of the 
p r o p e r t y i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y O c t o b e r , 1974, when i t r e c e i v e d 10 
acres as a s e t t l e m e n t with Emigrat ion (R. 240, paragraph 19(a)). 
Although October of 1974 was the f i r s t time t h a t Appel lant could 
e f f e c t i v e l y e x e r c i s e any p o r t i o n of i t s o p t i o n , s u f f i c i e n t 
acreage to s a t i s f y the fu l l o b l i g a t i o n was yet unava i l ab l e . 
Between 1970 and 1973, the Respondent was invo lved in a 
l a w s u i t w i t h o t h e r p a r t i e s to t he s u b j e c t Agreement . Those 
p a r t i e s were a l s o s eek ing payment in land or money p u r s u a n t to 
t h e i r r i g h t s under the Agreement . At t h a t t i m e , A p p e l l a n t was 
encouraged by Respondent no t to j o i n in t h a t a c t i o n and was g iven 
assurances t h a t he would be paid in fu l l if he would be p a t i e n t . 
In view of the f a c t s t h a t Respondent had no p r o p e r t y u n t i l l a t e 
1974, t h a t Responent had pursuaded A p p e l l a n t no t to j o i n the 
e a r l i e r ac t ion promising f u l l payment l a t e r , and t h a t Appellant 
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was thereafter temporarily incapacitated by a serious heart 
attack, Appellant's demand of February 7, 1978 must be considered 
to be an exercise of that option within a reasonable time. The 
circumstances of this case dictate that a reasonable period must 
extend at least until the option holder is aware of either the 
ability of the obligor to perform or the obligorfs intent not to 
do so. Any finding of the trial court to the contrary must be 
overturned as against the evidence. 
Before the lower Court, Respondent construed Section 3 as 
giving Appellant the right to request property only from acreage 
released prior to July 1, 1968, regardless of when said option is 
exercised. The Section is not unambiguous, but Appellant asserts 
that its intended and more logical meaning is to allow Appellant 
to request property from acreage released prior to that request. 
The date of July 1, 1968 clearly indicates the date upon which 
the option is first exercisable, but does not limit the property 
which may be chosen. Appellant has a contractual right to select 
from property, "theretofore" released by ESLIC, in lieu of 
repayment from Respondent. That right first came into existence 
on July 1, 1968 and continued as an available option for a 
reasonable time. 
Appellant has reason to believe that Respondent presently 
has or has had, during the pendency of this lawsuit, title to a 
certain amount of the subject property (R. 240, paragraph 
19(b,c)). However, Respondent has not been willing to disclose 
the description of the specific property so held. Appellant, 
9 
thus, is entitled to have Security Title Company, the escrow 
holder, select from the acreage held by Respondent "sufficient of 
the acreage . . . to fully satisfy and discharge any remaining 
unpaid balance" to Appellant (R. 278, Section 3). 
1• UL 129 4 acres are not presently available, Appellant 
has a right to money damages equal to the fair market 
value of the unavailable acreage at Jeremy Ranch. 
Respondent, at various times through this lawsuit, claimed 
that it presently owns few, if any, acres of the Jeremy Ranch 
property. If true, specific performance of the option provision 
in Section 3 of the Agreement would be impossible. 
[S]ince equity does not undertake to do a vain and 
useless thing, and does not grant a decree of specific 
performance when it appears that the Defendant is 
unable to comply with his contract - no decree of 
specific performance will issue against a vendor in 
a land contract who has no title or interest in the 
land that he contracted to convey . . . . 
71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, §126 (1973). 
Applying the rule to an option contract in Lowe v. Harmon, 
115 P.2d 297, 302 (Or. 1941), the court said, "specific 
performance will not be deemed against an optionor who is not 
able, for want of title, to comply with the option contract." 
In this case, however, Respondent admits to its present 
ownership of various interests in the Jeremy Ranch property but 
is allegedly unable to convey the full title or the full amount 
of proprty which it contracted to sell (R. 240, paragraph 
19(b,c)). Nevertheless, Appellant may elect to take any acreage 
to which Respondent currently holds title; the remainder of the 
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judgment will be left to remedies at law. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Specific Performance, §§116, 117 (1973). 
Remedies at law for the vendor's breach of a contract 
include the purchaser's loss of bargain plus any special damages 
foreseeable at the time of contract. The measure of damages for 
breach of contract is described as "the amount which would have 
been received if the contract had been performed, which means the 
value of the contract, including the profits and advantages which 
are its direct results and fruits." 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, §47 
(1965). This general rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959, 961 (1923), 
and applied to land sale contracts in Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 
771, 772 (Utah 1977). 
The damages caused by breach of contract are to be measured 
as of the date of the breach. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 
368 P.2d 597, 601 (1962). Appellant's demand for acreage was 
made in February, 1978 (R. 241, paragraph 20). It was not until 
that date that Respondent breached its promise to convey land. 
Since Respondent breached its contractual obligation to convey 
129.4 acres to Appellant, and it contends that it does not now 
have any interest in the Ranch beyond a few acres, Appellant is 
entitled to any acreage currently owned by Respondent plus a 
money judgment for the fair market value as of the date of breach 
of the average remaining property such as would total 129.4 
acres. Both Appellant and Respondent agree that as of February, 
1978, the approximate value of the property in question was 
$375.00 per acre (R. 241, paragraph 21). 
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2. Appellant1s claim for land or fair market value thereof 
is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Respondent's only defense to this action is that the statute 
of limitations has lapsed and left Appellant without a legal 
remedy (R. 209), Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) prescribes "an action upon any contract, 
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in the preceding section" to be brought 
within six years. The statute of limitations begins to accrue on 
the date of the breach of contract, not the date on which it was 
signed or the date that performance provided therein might be 
completed . 
This Court declared that the statute of limitations does 
"not begin to run until a suit or cause of action exists," 
Kimball v. McCornick, 80 Utah 189, 259 P. 313, 317 (1926). The 
Court dealt with the question as to when a cause of action 
accrues in State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 
P.2d 575, 577 (1940): 
Ordinarily, a cause of action for a debt begins to run 
when the debt is due and payable because at that time 
an action can be maintained to enforce it. But when 
some controlling statute or a contract existing 
between the parties provides that an additional 
thing be done before action may be brought, such as 
a statutory provision that a return must be filed, 
or, as in some insurance contracts, a provision 
that suit may not be brought before a certain time 
after the claimed loss, the statute of limitations 
does not start to run until the time when suit may 
be maintained even though interest on the amount of 
the liability may begin to run from the time it is 
due and payable. (Emphasis added) 
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Accordingly, a cause of ac t ion on a con t r ac t debt does not accrue 
aga ins t the debtor u n t i l a l l of the requi rements for payment to 
the c r e d i t o r have been met. 
A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t t o r e q u e s t p r o p e r t y in 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of any o u t s t a n d i n g amount due and owing from 
Respondent f i r s t a r o s e on J u l y 1, 1968 (R. 278, S e c t i o n 3) . The 
Agreement gave Appellant the opt ion to choose from any proper ty 
t h e r e t o f o r e r e l e a s e d by ESLIC. Each year from 1964 t o 1967, 
Respondent s ecu red a r e l e a s e of p r o p e r t y from ESLIC. However, 
t h e s e annual r e l e a s e s were o n l y for so much p r o p e r t y as would 
g a r n e r p r o c e e d s on r e s a l e to pay each annual payment due t o 
ESLIC. In f a c t , no r e l e a s e s would have been g iven a t a l l i f 
ESLIC were not given a l l proceeds (other than t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s ) . 
T r a n s f e r of t h e p r o p e r t y t h rough Respondent to the t h i r d p a r t y 
would not be made u n t i l and u n l e s s a l l p r o c e e d s were pa id t o 
ESLIC. 
From 1964 t h rough 1970, Respondent was unab le to d e l i v e r 
t i t l e to any of the proper ty to Appel lant . There was no p roper ty 
which had been re leased by ESLIC but not s imul taneous ly sold to a 
t h i r d p a r t y t o meet the annual payment o b l i g a t i o n on t h e 1961 
Agreement (R. 236, p a r a g r a p h 7 ) . A p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t to s e l e c t 
proper ty f i r s t arose in 1968 s ince Respondent had not repaid him 
in f u l l . But h i s e l e c t i o n r i g h t was then h o l l o w ; t h e r e was no 
a v a i l a b l e land which had yet been re leased to Respondent. 
S e c t i o n 3 r e q u i r e d an a f f i r m a t i v e " r e q u e s t " to be made by 
A p p e l l a n t to o b l i g a t e Respondent to convey r e l e a s e d p r o p e r t y . 
U n t i l such r e q u e s t was made, Respondent had no du ty to t r a n s f e r 
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title, A cause of action could not accrue until this last 
requirement was fulfilled by Appellant. The statute of 
limitations could likewise not begin to run until the cause of 
action accrued, 
B
- APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
In the event that Appellant's claim for property pursuant to 
Section 3 of the subject Agreement is conclusively found to be 
without merit, Appellant is entitled to money damages from 
Respondent for breach of contract. 
Section 2 of the subject Agreement states: 
2. As consideration of the release given by each of 
the parties of the first partf as set forth herein 
below, Knight agrees to pay to Security Title Company, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as escrow holder for Parties of the 
First Part 50 percent of the gross profits actually 
realized by Knight from the resale of lands acquired 
by Knight from the Jeremy Ranch until each of the 
Parties of the First Part has been repaid the sum of 
money advanced by him, as is set forth above, plus 
10 percent thereof, with said repayment to be made 
without interest. The term "gross profits", as used 
herein, shall be computed as follows: 
(a) The cost of the land to Knight shall be con-
sidered to be $85.00 per acre, which is the average 
per acre price Knight has contracted to pay for the 
entire 16,500 acres. 
(b) All sums received by Knight from the resale 
of any of the Jeremy Ranch land in excess of $85.00 per 
acre shall be considered to be gross profits. 
(c) Knight will retain the first $85.00 per acre 
paid as his cost of the land and 50 percent of the 
gross profits, to reimburse him for legal expense, 
development expense, sales expense, etc. 
(d) The other 50 percent of the gross profit 
will be paid to Security Title Company of Salt Lake 
City, as escrow holder for the use and benefit of the 
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P a r t i e s of the F i r s t P a r t , and said escrow holder wi l l 
be i n s t ruc t ed to for thwith d i s t r i b u t e pro r a t a a l l sums 
received by the escrow holder to P a r t i e s of the F i r s t 
P a r t , The monies so d isbursed by the escrow holder 
s h a l l be pro ra ted among the P a r t i e s of the F i r s t P a r t , 
so tha t each of *said p a r t i e s r e ce ive s the same p r o -
por t ion of each disbursement as the money paid by him 
to Knight, as a f o r e s a i d , bea rs to the t o t a l money paid 
by a l l of the, P a r t i e s of the F i r s t Par t to Knight• 
Respondent a d m i t s to the v a l i d i t y of t he o r i g i n a l deb t and 
i t s nonpayment t h e r e o f (R. 239-240) and a s s e r t s the s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s as i t s sole defense (R. 209) • 
1. A p p e l l a n t ' s claim for $10,000.00 p lus ten percent 
thereon i s not barred by the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . 
The subjec t Agreement provides t h a t Respondent was ob l iga ted 
to repay to Appel lant $10,000.00 p lus 10% thereon only out of the 
p r o c e e d s from the r e s a l e of Je remy Ranch land (R. 282) , S e c t i o n 
12). If no s a l e s were made nor proceeds rece ived , Respondent had 
no o b l i g a t i o n to Appel lant . Fur thermore , Respondent 's o b l i g a t i o n 
to A p p e l l a n t was on ly to be r e p a i d ou t of "50 p e r c e n t of the 
gross p r o f i t s a c t u a l l y r ea l i zed" by Respondent from each r e s a l e 
of land (R. 277, S e c t i o n 2 ) . F i n a l l y , A p p e l l a n t was made to 
acknowledge the terms of Respondent 's underlying con t r ac t with 
ESLIC, which requi red annual p r i n c i p a l payments of $160,000.00, 
and t ha t unless Respondent made those payments, Appellant would 
r e c e i v e no repayment e x c e p t from p r e - d e f a u l t g r o s s p r o f i t s (R. 
279, S e c t i o n 5 ) . 
A p p e l l a n t could not m a i n t a i n a s u i t for t he b r each of t h i s 
c o n t r a c t u n t i l and un less (1) Respondent continued to make t ime ly 
payments to ESLIC, (2) Respondent was able to r e s e l l po r t i ons of 
t h e land r e l e a s e d by ESLIC, (3) p r o c e e d s from t h e r e s a l e s would 
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inc lude gross p r o f i t s , and (4) those proceeds were not o therwise 
r e q u i r e d to f u l f i l l payment o b l i g a t i o n s to ESLIC. U n t i l t h e s e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s were m e t , Respondent was not o b l i g a t e d to repay 
Appel lan t , nor could Appellant enforce the c o n t r a c t through l ga l 
a c t i o n . 
The f i r s t p r o c e e d s f r e e from o b l i g a t i o n to the u n d e r l y i n g 
c o n t r a c t w i t h ESLIC were r e c e i v e d in t h e s a l e of l a n d t o 
Emigration in 1970. All s a l e s p r io r to t ha t da te were of only so 
much land as would be r e l e a s e d by ESLIC to g e n e r a t e s u f f i c i e n t 
f u n d s t o a l l o w R e s p o n d e n t t o make i t s a n n u a l $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
payments. 
In the lower C o u r t , Respondent a s s e r t e d t h a t because each 
r e s a l e of p r o p e r t y , b e g i n n i n g in 1964, produced p r o c e e d s in 
e x c e s s of $85.00 per a c r e , and s i n c e none of s a i d p r o c e e d s were 
paid to Appel lan t , each r e s a l e a l so c o n s t i t u t e d an ac tua l breach 
of c o n t r a c t and s t a r t e d the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s to run (R. 
214-217) . Th is c o n t e n t i o n i g n o r e s the c l e a r i n t e n t of the 
c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s as evidenced in the Agreement. The paramount 
conce rn of the p a r t i e s was to keep the c o n t r a c t wi th ESLIC 
c u r r e n t . Wi thout t he o p t i o n on t h e l a n d , n e i t h e r p a t t y could 
enjoy a n t i c i p a t e d p r o f i t s . The apparent purpose of Sect ion 5 of 
the Agreement was the acknowledgment of the primacy of t h a t ESLIC 
o b l i g a t i o n . 
In May of 1970, Respondent r e c e i v e d $500,000.00 down and a 
s c h e d u l e of i n s t a l l m e n t s fo r t h e o u t s t a n d i n g b a l a n c e of 
$1,600,000.00 pursuant to the sa l e of 12,500 acres to Emigrat ion. 
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This was the f i r s t r e c e i p t of p r o c e e d s by Respondent from the 
r e s a l e of l a n d , wh ich p r o c e e d s were n o t r e q u i r e d t o be 
i m m e d i a t e l y t r a n s f e r r e d to ESLIC. However, A p p e l l a n t was not 
e n t i t l e d to be r e p a i d u n t i l g r o s s p r o f i t s on t he s a l e were 
a c t u a l l y r e a l i z e d (R. 2 7 7 , S e c t i o n 2 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
Agreement , Respondent was t o " r e t a i n the f i r s t $85.00 per a c r e 
and 50 p e r c e n t of t he g r o s s p r o f i t s " b e f o r e A p p e l l a n t was 
e n t i t l e d to any payment . Defined as "sums r e c e i v e d . . • in 
excess of $85.00 per ac re , " no gross p r o f i t s would be r e a l i z e d on 
the 1970 s a l e u n t i l $1 ,062,500.00 was r e c e i v e d from E m i g r a t i o n . 
A p p e l l a n t , t h e r e f o r e , was no t e n t i t l e d to any r e p a y m e n t , nor 
could t h e Agreement be c o n s i d e r e d b reached by Respondent u n t i l 
t h e f i r s t r e a l i z a t i o n of " f r e e " g r o s s p r o f i t s in 1 9 7 3 . 
C o n s i d e r i n g t h e d a t e of a c t u a l b r e a c h , t he i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e s e 
p r o c e e d i n g s in 1978 i s we l l w i t h i n the s i x - y e a r s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s . 
2. Any p o t e n t i a l d i s a b l i n g s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s t o l l e d 
with Respondent 's payment to A p p e l l a n t ' s co -ob l igees 
under the sub jec t Agreement. 
The e a r l i e s t t i m e a b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t by Respondent could 
have o c c u r r e d was 1973 when " f r e e " g r o s s p r o f i t s were f i r s t 
rece ived . However, in 1974, two of Appe l l an t ' s fe l low i n v e s t o r s 
were pa id p u r s u a n t to the same c o n t r a c t . Utah Code Annota ted 
§78-12-44, 1953, as amended, s t a t e s t h a t : 
In any case founed on c o n t r a c t , when any pa r t of the 
p r i n c i p a l or i n t e r e s t s h a l l have been pa id , or an 
acknowledgment of an e x i s t i n g l i a b i l i t y , debt or 
c la im, or any promise to pay the same, s h a l l have 
been made, anr^cTtion may be brought within the 
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period prescr ibed for the same a f te r such payment 
acknowledgment or promise . . . . 
Payments pursuant to l i t i g a t i o n were made to J. Kent Buehler 
and Richard D. Madsen in 1974, w i t h i n the s i x - y e a r s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s of any p o s s i b l e b r e a c h (R. 233-234, 286-289) . The 
payments were made by Respondent wi th a w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t 
p u r s u a n t to t he same Agreement t h a t i s c o n t e s t e d in t h i s c a s e . 
Madsen and Buehler were p a r t n e r s with Appellant a t the time the 
o r i g i n a l d e b t a r o s e , and a l l were t r e a t e d as an e n t i t y e n t i t l e d 
" P a r t i e s of the F i r s t Part" throughout the Agreement. 
In Dixon v. B a r t l e t t , 176 Ca l . 572, 169 P. 236 (1917)., a 
l e t t e r acknowledging a c o n t r a c t debt addressed to one pa r tne r was 
held s u f f i c i e n t to t o l l the s t a t u t e aga ins t a l l the p a r t n e r s . In 
Krause v. Spurgeon , 256 S.W. 1072 (Mo. App. 1923) , p a r t payment 
to one of two j o i n t ho lders of a note was s u f f i c i e n t to t o l l the 
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a g a i n s t both h o l d e r s . In Hiscock v. 
H i scock , 240 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1932) , payment to one of s e v e r a l c o -
owners of a mor tgage which had been b a r r e d by the s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s acted to rev ive the mortgage to a l l mortgagees. 
The payments of cash and land accompanied by w r i t t e n 
s e t t l e m e n t s t o Madsen and B u e h l e r t o l l e d t h e s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s a g a i n s t A p p e l l a n t . Thus , the p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n 
began anew in 1974. The a c t i o n b r o u g h t in 1978 was w i t h i n the 
s ix -yea r per iod . 
3. Even i f appl icable , the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s would bar 
only a po r t i on of A p p e l l a n t ' s c la im. 
18 
Section 4 of the subject Agreement allows Appellant to 
"continue to receive his pro-rated share of the gross profits 
until he has been reimbursed if he has not been fully reimbursed 
by July 1, 1968," The alternative opinion was to recover 
sufficient land at the rate of $85.00 per acre to satisfy his 
account. The language of this alternative requires a "request to 
reconvey" whereas the desire to continue in profit participation 
necessitates no such notice. No request was made by Appellant 
prior to the 1978 demand, and Respondent apparently assumed 
Appellant's election was to wait for payment from gross profits. 
Section 13 of the Agreement anticipates Respondent selling 
its interest in the property "as an entity" and outlines 
Appellant's rights in such a sale. The sale to Emigration on May 
8, 1970 wasf indeed, the sale of Respondent's entire remaining 
interest in the Ranch and would apparently be subject to this 
section. However, the particular clauses of this section specify 
sales consummated by December 31, 1968: 
(c) If Knight receives an installment sale contract 
which would be paid off in full before December 31, 
1968, then Knight will, from each payment he receives, 
pay to First Parties (i.e., Fredericksen), as afore-
said, the same proportion of the amount due to each of 
them as payment made to Knight bears to the total 
purchase price to Knight. 
(d) If the installment payments are accepted by 
Knight extending the term of payment beyond 1969, 
then Knight will, nevertheless, pay First Parties 
in full from the funds so received by December 31, 
1968. The annual payments shall be equal. 
In the lower Court, Respondent contended that although 
inapplicable to the Emigration sale, subsection (d) offers 
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guidance in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s to 
not "str ing out the payments for the Plaint iff ." Certainly, the 
Agreement was not intended to indef ini te ly postpone payments to 
Appel lant . Neither was the i n t e n t to force fu l l payment to 
Appellant and h i s c o - a s s o c i a t e s upon the i n i t i a l i n s t a l l m e n t 
payment which may have had a c r i p p l i n g e f fec t on Respondent 's 
cash flow. This fac tor i s e s p e c i a l l y r e l evan t in l i g h t of 
Responentfs admission tha t there were l iens against the property 
exceeding the $500,000.00 down payment made by Emigration in May, 
1970 (R. 237, paragraph 10). 
The only reasonable in te rpre ta t ion of Sections 2, 4, and 13 
extended to 1970 and beyond i s t ha t Appellant should have the 
o p t i o n to c o n t i n u e to wa i t for p r o f i t s to be r e a l i z e d by 
Respondent; that receipts from the instal lment contract between 
Respondent and Emigration should be f i r s t used to recover i t s 
c o s t of land ($85.00 per a c r e ) , and t h a t only then should 
Appellant get h i s t o t a l amount due out of one-hal f the gross 
p ro f i t s received. Thus, the control l ing provisions for payments 
to Appellant would be Sec t ions 2 and 4 cont inuing u n t i l gross 
p r o f i t s were r e a l i z e d . Sect ion 13 i s i napp l i c ab l e s ince i t 
contemplates only an exception to Section 4 which did not a r i se . 
Nevertheless, Section 13 is useful as a tool in understanding the 
intent ions of the contracting pa r t i e s . 
In the even t t h a t t he f i r s t b reach of R e s p o n d e n t ' s 
o b l i g a t i o n to Appellant i s found to have occurred in 1970 upon 
Appellant 's sale to Emigration and receipt by Respondent of the 
20 
$500,000.00 down payment, and i t i s fur ther held t h a t the p r io r 
payments to Madsen and Buehler did not t o l l the s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s , i t must a l so be found t ha t the breach of c o n t r a c t 
was not singular but a repeated breach which created a new cause 
of ac t ion each time Respondent f a i l ed to pay out of the gross 
prof i t s from each installment payment received. This reasoning 
appears consistent with Appellant 's instal lment sale treatment of 
the 1970 sa le (R. 220-222). The p rov i s ions of subsect ion 13(c) 
offer guidance for such an i n s t a l l m e n t s a l e . Respondent had a 
duty to pay to Appellant the same propor t ion of the amount due 
him as Emigration's instal lment payment made to Responent bears 
to the to t a l $2,100,000.00 purchase pr ice . 
I n s t a l l m e n t s a l e s are t r e a t e d uniquely by s t a t u t e s of 
l imi t a t ion . 
In case of an obligation payment by ins ta l lments , the 
s ta tu te of l imi ta t ions runs against each installment 
from the time when an action might be brought to 
recover i t . . . [T]he rule that the s t a tu te of 
l imi ta t ions begins to run against each installment 
of an obligation payable by instal lments only from 
the time the installment becomes due applies although 
the debtor has the option to pay the ent i re in-
debtedness at any time. 
51 Am. Jur . 2d, Limitation of Actions §133 (1970). 
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized th i s pr inciple in Indian Ter r i -
tory I l l u m i n a t i n g Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 146, 120 P.2d 
349 (1941). The cour t held t h a t a cont inuing covenant to make 
payments when breached g ives r i s e to a cause of ac t ion each day 
breached . 
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The reason for the rule is while the repeated and 
successive breaches of the implied covenant con-
tinue, the right of action for subsequent breaches 
does not accrue upon the first breach, but accrues 
and the statute begins to run as and when each 
breach occurs. Like an account not mutual in nature, 
but all on one side, the cause of action arises on 
the date of each item or breach, and the items 
within the statutory period of limitations do not draw 
after them those of longer standing. 
120 P.2d at 352-53. 
In Bank of America Trust & Savings Ass'n. v. McLaughlin, 152 
C.A. 2d 911, 313 P.2d 220,223 (1957), the cour t ruled on a note 
payable in i n s t a l l m e n t s , severa l of which had not been paid and 
aga ins t which the s t a t u t e had run. "Where money i s payable in 
i n s t a l l m e n t s , the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s begins to run aga ins t 
the cause of action for the recovery of an unpaid instal lment at 
the time i t is payable." 
Section 4 of the subject Agreement s t a t e s that if Appellant 
had not been fully reimbursed by July 1, 1968, he was en t i t l ed to 
" rece ive h i s p ro - r a t ed share of gross p r o f i t s u n t i l he has been 
reimbursed." The sa le to Emigration on May 8, 1970 was an 
instal lment contract . Appellant was thereby en t i t l ed to payments 
on a pro r a t a b a s i s out of the 50 percent of the gross p r o f i t s 
r e a l i z e d from each i n s t a l l m e n t . If i t i s held t h a t Respondent 
did not have a r i g h t to keep the f i r s t $85.00 per a c r e , but t ha t 
the payments to Appellant should be proportionate to Emigrat ions 
i n s t a l l m e n t payments, the amounts due Appel lan t , based on 
$11,00.00 due in 1970, are l i s t ed below: 
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SCHEDULE OF RECEIPTS AND AMOUNT DUE 
R e c e i p t from 
E m i g r a t i o n P e r c e n t Amount Due 
May, 1970 $ 500 ,000 .00 23 .8 $ 2 ,618 .00 
A p r i l , 1971 75 ,000 .00 3.6 396.00 
A p r i l , 1972 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 3.6 399.00 
A p r i l , 1973 (Remainder) 1 , 449 ,000 .00 69 .0 7 ,590 .00 
Under t h i s i n s t a l l m e n t a p p r o a c h , even i f t h e s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s b e g a n t o - r u n f o r a b r e a c h of t h e c o n t r a c t by 
R e s p o n d e n t i n 1 9 7 0 , t h i s r u n n i n g would n o t a f f e c t t h e p a y m e n t s 
made in 1972 and 1973 s i n c e t h e C o m p l a i n t was f i l e d i n March , 
1 9 7 8 . A p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 7 , 9 8 6 . 0 0 i s w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t e and 
a c c e s s i b l e . 
Th i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i n s t a l l m e n t c o n t r a c t a p p l i c a b i l i t y i s 
one w h i c h a v o i d s a f o r f e i t u r e by A p p e l l a n t . The c o u r t s a r e 
u s u a l l y eage r t o c o n s t r u e c o n t r a c t s to avoid f o r f e i t u r e s "which 
a re r ega rded as o d i u s to the law." Morgan v. So renson , 3 Utah 2d 
428, 286 P.2d 229 (1955) . In R u s s e l l v. Park C i t y Utah C o r p o r a -
t i o n , 29 Utah 2d 1 8 4 , 506 P.2d 1274 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , t h i s C o u r t i n f e r r e d 
t h a t a p a r t y who s e e k s t o e n f o r c e a f o r f e i t u r e s h o u l d be i n 
s t r i c t c o m p l i a n c e of f o r f e i t u r e p r e r e q u i s i t e s . t f [ T ] h e g e n e r a l 
r u l e t h a t one who s e e k s t o i n v o k e a f o r f e i t u r e m u s t s t r i c t l y 
comply w i t h t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s t h e r e o f b e c a u s e f o r f e i t u r e s a r e no t 
f avored in t h e law." Al though t h i s i s no t a c a s e of c o n t r a c t u a l 
f o r f e i t u r e p r o v i s i o n s , t he p r i n c i p l e should be ex t ended , A c o u r t 
i n e q u i t y w i l l n o t c o n s t r u e a c o n t r a c t in favor of a p a r t y which 
i s c o n t i n u a l l y d e f a u l t e d in i t s payments over one who has a l r e a d y 
g i v e n i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n and i s i n d a n g e r of l o s i n g i t s e n t i r e 
cause of a c t i o n . 
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C. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE ACCRUING 
SINCE THE MATURITY DATE OF THE OBLIGATION PLUS ALL COURT 
COSTS INCURRED INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
The s u b j e c t A g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e s t h a t A p p e l l a n t r e c e i v e h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p l u s 10% t h e r e o n , b u t i n c l u d e s no 
i n t e r e s t . T h i s A g r e e m e n t and i t s o b l i g a t i o n s w e r e o b v i o u s l y 
i n t e n d e d to be s a t i s f i e d and f u l f i l l e d by December 3 1 , 1968. i t 
w a s n o t a n t i c i p a t e d by t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s n o r i s i t 
r e a s o n a b l e t o a s s u m e t h a t R e s p o n d e n t s h o u l d h a v e had use of 
A p p e l l a n t ' s $10,000.00 for more than 17 y e a r s w i t h on ly 10% added 
t h e r e t o . 
U tah Code A n n o t a t e d , § 1 4 - 1 - 1 ( 1 9 5 3 , a s amended) p r o v i d e s : 
"The l e g a l r a t e of i n t e r e s t f o r t h e l o a n or f o r b e a r a n c e of any 
m o n e y , g o o d s , o r t h i n g s in a c t i o n s h a l l be s i x p e r c e n t pe r 
annum," Th i s s t a t u t e was amended in 1981 , b u t t he amendment has 
no e f f e c t on t h i s o b l i g a t i o n . The m a j o r i t y o f r u l i n g 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s have s u p p o r t e d t h e r u l e t h a t t h e r a t e of i n t e r e s t 
a f t e r m a t u r i t y upon an o b l i g a t i o n , r e c i t i n g a c e r t a i n r a t e 
e x p r e s s l y u n t i l m a t u r i t y and s i l e n t as t o t h e r a t e t h e r e a f t e r , i s 
t h e l e g a l r a t e . 16 A.L.R. 2d 9 0 2 . In A l l e n v . M i l l e r , 84 N.W. 
2d 571 (N.D. 1 9 5 7 ) , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t a n o t e p a y a b l e w i t h o u t 
i n t e r e s t b e f o r e m a t u r i t y and s i l e n t as to i n t e r e s t a f t e r m a t u r i t y 
b e a r s i n t e r e s t a t t h e l e g a l r a t e from t h e d a t e of d e f a u l t t o d a t e 
of payment or t o d a t e t h a t judgment i s e n t e r e d . 
In Bjork v . A p r i l I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . , 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 
1 9 7 7 ) , t h i s C o u r t commen ted on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of p r e j u d g m e n t 
i n t e r e s t : 
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As to the allowance of in t e res t before judgment, t h i s 
Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is 
c l ea r , v i z : where the damage is complete and the 
amount of the loss is fixed as of a par t icular time, 
and that loss can be measured by facts and f igures , 
in te res t should be allowed from that time and not 
from the date of the judgment. 
Appellant 's r ight to repayment in cash matured in 1973 when 
Respondent had suff icient "free" gross prof i t s to sa t i s fy their 
contractual obl igat ion. If the Court finds that the Respondent 
breached i t s c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n , Appellant i s e n t i t l e d to 
i n t e r e s t on the $11,000.00 accruing at 6% per annum from 1973 
unt i l the entry of judgment herein. 
A p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t to p roper ty or the f a i r market value of 
same natured in February, 1978 when Appellant exerc ised h i s 
c o n t r a c t u a l opt ion to demand 129.4 ac r e s . If the Court decides 
tha t Appellant i s e n t i t l e d to a conveyance of p rope r ty , he i s 
a lso e n t i t l e d to i n t e r e s t on the f a i r market value of t h a t 
p roper ty as of 1978, from February, 1978 u n t i l the en t ry of 
judgment herein. 
Utah law is clear that a t to rney ' s fees are chargeable to an 
opposing pa r ty only if the re i s a c o n t r a c t u a l or s t a t u t o r y 
l i a b i l i t y t h e r e f o r . Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 
1977). The Agreement provides: 
Should any of the pa r t i e s breach th i s agree-
ment, and the other be required to secure legal 
counsel to enforce i t , the defaulting party agrees 
to pay a l l court costs incurred and a reasonable 
a t to rney ' s fee for the enforcement of the agreement. 
(R. ,284, paragraph 16). 
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Respondent has a d m i t t e d b r e a c h i n g t h e Agreement (R. 2 3 9 - 2 4 1 , 
p a r a g r a p h s 1 4 - 1 7 , 2 0 ) , I t i s c l e a r t h a t A p p e l l a n t was r e q u i r e d 
t o s e c u r e l e g a l c o u n s e l t o e n f o r c e t h e A g r e e m e n t . I f t h e C o u r t 
f i n d s i n f a v o r of A p p e l l a n t on any of h i s c l a i m s , he i s a l s o 
e n t i t l e d t o a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y 1 s f e e . 
V I . CONCLUSION 
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i s c o n t r a r y t o l a w and e q u i t y . 
The D i s t r i c t Cour t h a s , w i t h o u t l e g a l l y v a l i d g r o u n d s , u n d e r t a k e n 
t o r e l i e v e R e s p o n d e n t from t h e b u r d e n of a l a w f u l and v a l i d 
c o n t r a c t . 
B a s e d on t h e a n a l y s i s s e t f o r t h a b o v e , A p p e l l a n t i s 
e n t i t l e d , p u r s u a n t t o t h e s u b j e c t A g r e e m e n t and h i s r e q u e s t of 
F e b r u a r y 6 , 1 9 7 8 , t o a c o n v e y a n c e of 129.4 a c r e s of t h e p r o p e r t y 
known as Je remy Ranch. Said conveyance i s a u t h o r i z e d by t h e 1963 
A g r e e m e n t a t A p p e l l a n t ' s o p t i o n i n l i e u o f p a y m e n t s on 
R e s p o n d e n t ' s acknowledged unpaid c o n t r a c t u a l d e b t . A p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e q u e s t , t h e r e f o r , was r e a s o n a b l y made u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
and was t h e l a s t a c t r e q u i r e d of A p p e l l a n t b e f o r e R e s p o n d e n t ' s 
o b l i g a t i o n to convey m a t u r e d . 
I f R e s p o n e n t d o e s n o t now h a v e t i t l e t o 129 .4 a c r e s of t h e 
s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y , i t should be r e q u i r e d t o convey t o A p p e l l a n t so 
much of s a i d p r o p e r t y a s i s now i n i t s o w n e r s h i p . The b a l a n c e of 
h i s o b l i g a t i o n s h o u l d t h e n be s a t i s i f i e d by t h e p a y m e n t t o 
A p p e l l a n t of t h e 1978 f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e of so many of t h e 129.4 
a c r e s which a r e no t so conveyed . 
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In the e v e n t t h a t Respondent i s no t found to be o b l i g a t e d t o 
c o n v e y p r o p e r t y t o A p p e l l a n t , A p p e l l a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e 
a c k n o w l e d g e d c o n t r a c t d e b t i n h i s f a v o r i n t h e a m o u n t o f 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
F i n a l l y , o n l y i f t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t A p p e l l a n t i s n o t 
e n t i t l e d to a conveyance of p r o p e r t y and t h a t Respondent b reached 
i t s c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s g i v i n g r i s e t o a v a l i d c a u s e of 
a c t i o n p r i o r t o 1 9 7 3 , A p p e l l a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e p r o c e e d s of 
e a c h i n s t a l l m e n t n o t l o s t by any a l l e g e d r u n n i n g of t h e s t a t u t e 
of l i m i t a t i o n s . 
In any e v e n t , A p p e l l a n t i s e n t i t l e d to i n t e r e s t a c c r u i n g a t 
t h e l e g a l r a t e s i n c e m a t u r i t y of the o b l i g a t i o n , a l l Court c o s t s , 
and a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s fee i n c u r r e d in t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s for 
t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e s u b j e c t A g r e e m e n t a s p r o v i d e d i n t h a t 
Agreement . 
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d and 
remanded for e n t r y of j udgmen t in favor of A p p e l l a n t . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / 7 day of F e b r u a r y , 1982. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
Marsden, Orton & L i l j e n q u i s t 
A t t o r n e y s for A p p e l l a n t 
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FILED DISTRICT COUR. 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 1 h 2007 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG ANDERSON : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
CASE NO. 070904196 
vs. : 
RICHARD DAVIS : 
Defendant. : 
The Parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, 
which were before the Court for hearing on July 13, 2007. Having 
considered the motions, memoranda and argument submitted by the 
parties, the Court enters the following order: 
BACKGROUND1 
This matter concerns the interests in and conveyances of 
real property located at 136 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah (the "Property"). In 1996, owner Roy Simmons conveyed the 
Property to Carman, LLC for $60,000. Carman, LLC paid down $500 
1
 The following facts were not disputed by the parties in 
their opposing memoranda, and are deemed admitted for the purpose 
of this motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
7(c)(3)(A) ("Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum 
is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment, unless 
controverted by the responding party") and 7(c)(3)(B) (UA 
memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted . . . " ) . 
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and signed a Trust Deed Note ("Note") for $59,500 and a Trust 
Deed, with an Assignment of Rents. The Note was an installment 
obligation, requiring Carman, LLC to make monthly payments of 
specified amounts, with two balloon payments in the first year, 
and the principal balance and accrued interest coming due on June 
1, 2006 {See Trust Deed Note Exhibit "A') . The Deed was recorded 
on September 10, 1996. 
Carman, LLC made regular payments on the Note through 
December 1997, and irregular installments thereafter, the last of 
which was made on July 15, 1998. The Note is still in arrears, 
and was not assigned to any other person or entity. Although the 
Note contained an optional acceleration clause, Mr. Simmons never 
exercised that option. 
At some point, Carman, LLC conveyed the Property to E. L. 
Whitehead, against whom the Plaintiff previously obtained a 
judgment of $147,000 {See Third District Court No. 980912048). 
On or about January 20, 2006, the Plaintiff received the deed to 
the Property through a Sheriff's sale.2 
On or about October 24, 2 006, the Defendant was appointed as 
Successor Trustee under the Trust Deed to secure obligations in 
2
 Because Mr. Simmons properly filed the Trust Deed in 1996, 
the Plaintiff had at least constructive notice of the Note. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2006). 
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favor of Mr. Simmons, who is now deceased. The Defendant, in his 
capacity as Successor Trustee, filed a Notice of Default on 
November 1, 2 006 and sought to foreclose on the Property. The 
Defendant also gave notice of the Trustee's sale, which was 
scheduled for March 21, 2007. 
In December, 2006, the Plaintiff sent a letter to the 
Defendant, asserting that the Notice of Default was a wrongful 
lien because uthe promissory note ha[d] been paid in full and/or 
the six year statute of limitations for written agreements ha[d] 
r[u]n years ago." The Defendant responded to the Plaintiff's 
letter in January, 2007, asserting that the Plaintiff's interest 
in the property was that of a judgment lien creditor, and that 
the statute of limitations would not bar the pending foreclosure 
sale. The Plaintiff responded to the Defendant's letter on March 
20, 2007, and asserted that the statute of limitations barred Mr. 
Simmons'£ actions, citing Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 188 P. 2d 995 
(Utah 1948). The Defendant faxed the Plaintiff that afternoon, 
expressing his intention to go forward with the Trustee's sale, 
and attaching a memorandum examining the effect of the statute of 
limitations on installment contracts. However, the Plaintiff had 
filed a Lis Pendens on the property on March 16, 2007, and the 
Trustee's sale has not gone forward. 
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The Plaintiff brought suit in this court, alleging that the 
statute of limitations barred the Defendant's appointment as 
successor trustee and his right to foreclose on the Property, and 
seeking judgment against the Defendant under the Wrongful Lien 
Statute, for Slander of Title, and for Constructive Fraud. Each 
of the parties has moved for summary judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the 
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When considering cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the Court must consider each motion separately, 
viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
favor of the non-moving party. Prince, Yeates £ Geldzahler v. 
Young, 2004 UT 26, 510, 94 P.3d 179. 
The parties agree that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (2006) 
is the statute of limitations applicable to the interests created 
by the Note. They further agree that the Plaintiff has standing, 
as a party holding an interest in the Property, to plead the 
statute of limitations against the foreclosure proceeding. 
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The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Plaintiff moves for summary judgment for three of his 
four claims.3 First, he argues that the Defendant's foreclosure 
sale is barred by the statute of limitations, which is six years 
for "any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing." Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) (2006). He 
also asserts that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on his wrongful lien and constructive fraud claims. The Court 
will address each in turn. 
A. Statute of Limitations 
The thrust of the Plaintiff's argument is that, as noted in 
Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, "a vendee may plead the bar of the 
Statute of Limitations at the expiration of six years after the 
cause of action against the mortgagor has arisen." 188 P.2d 995, 
996 (Utah 1948) . The Plaintiff asserts that when Carman, LLC 
missed an installment in 1998, the Statute began to run against 
the obligation because that is when Mr. Simmons's right to 
institute a suit arose. The Defendant responds that because the 
Note was payable in installments, the statute did not run from 
3
 The Plaintiff did not move for summary judgment on his 
claim for slander of title. 
Anderson v. Davis PAGE 6 ORDER 
the first missed payment, but only attached when the entire Note 
came due. 
The parties phrase the issue before the court differently, 
but they call for the Court to determine the same thing: when did 
the cause of action accrue on the Note, triggering the statute of 
limitations?4 
(i) General Rule 
The Plaintiff correctly asserts that uan action based on a 
written contract must be commenced within six years after the 
cause of action has accrued," and that the statute of limitations 
"begins to run at the moment that a cause of action arises." 
Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983). 
u
'Ordinarily, a cause of action for a debt begins to run when the 
debt is due and payable because at that time an action can be 
maintained to enforce it." Id. 
Under a Note with a single payment date, the date upon which 
4
 Pursuant to Taylor Bros., the Plaintiff, as a purchaser, 
has standing to assert the statute of limitations because it 
"inure[s] to the benefit of a third party [the Plaintiff] who was 
not a party to the contract." Taylor Bros., 188 P.2d at 996. 
Thus, as a vendee, the Plaintiff has standing to assert the same 
defense to the obligation that Carman, LLC could have asserted, 
but has no rights or defenses greater than the debtor merely by 
virtue of his status as vendee. 
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the cause of action accrues is "when the note becomes due." 
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 80 P.2d 471, 478 (Utah 1938). 
However, Carman, LLC and Mr. Simmons did not execute a Note with 
a single due date. The Note was for monthly installment 
payments, which are governed by specific case law. 
(ii) Installment Contracts 
In Utah, when an obligation is met by installment payments, 
the statute of limitations generally begins to run on each 
defaulted payment as they come due. Such defaulted obligations 
"may be enforced by proper action whenever and as often as an 
installment falls due and remains unpaid." Johnson v. Johnson, 
88 P. 230, 232 (Utah 1906); accord Moab Nat'l Bank v. Keystone-
Wallace Resources, 517 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Utah 1973); Buell v. 
Duchesne Mercantile Co., 231 P. 123, 124 (Utah 1924). 
In Johnson, the defendant entered into a lifetime contract, 
promising to provide half of his annual crop yield to the 
plaintiff. Johnson, 88 P. at 230. The defendant previously 
failed to deliver the crops in 1901 and 1902, and the plaintiff 
had sued for those installments. Id. When the defendant again 
refused to deliver crops in 1903 and 1904, the plaintiff sued on 
those installments. The defendant asserted that the four-year 
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statute of limitations barred recovery on the 1903 and 1904 
obligations. Id. at 231. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
argument was "clearly without merit" and recognized that the 
action uwas not founded upon a breach of the entire contract, but 
upon the breaches only arising from the failure to pay the 
installments due for [1903 and 1904]." Id. at 231-32. The court 
further explained that while the plaintiff in 1901 umight 
possibly have sued for an entire breach and recover[ed] damages 
therefor, he did not choose to do so." Id. at 232. The Court of 
Appeals has since interpreted Johnson as adopting the rule used 
in the majority of jurisdictions governing installment contracts. 
See Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Int'l, 905 P.2d 312, 316 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) . 
In other words, in Utah, each missed installment generally 
creates its own cause of action, and the statute only begins to 
run against the particular defaulted installment as the default 
occurs. Because the debtor cannot default on his future 
installments by his delinquency in paying one that is currently 
due, the statute does not run against future installments until 
they become individually due. 
This rule is widely accepted throughout the United States. 
One court examined the rule's historical underpinnings in Cadle 
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Co. v. Prodoti, 716 A.2d 965 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998), and traced 
the rule from mid-eighteenth century France to its wide 
acceptance today. Id. at 966-67. New York's highest court has 
also explained the sound policy behind the rule: uIf a creditor's 
action against a [debtor] accrues wholly and immediately at the 
point of the first default in payment . . . then creditors would 
be left with no alternative or incentive but to accelerate the 
entire debt or risk losing all opportunity to pursue [it]." 
Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v. Campcore, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 1219, 
1222 (N.Y. 1993). In contrast, under the majority rule "parties 
might be able to work toward amicable and fair resolutions 
between themselves rather than immediately drawing litigation 
swords and marching off to a courthouse." Id. 
Carman, LLC executed an installment note with Mr. Simmons on 
May 10, 1996, with monthly obligations and balloon payments 
distributed over the next ten years. Although Carman, LLC first 
failed to meet its monthly obligations in mid-1998, its 
obligations to pay future monthly installments were not yet 
triggered. Without such an obligation, Mr. Simmons's cause of 
action had not accrued as to those future installments, and he 
could not enforce judgment on them unless he opted to accelerate 
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the payments.5 
Although the Plaintiff argues that "it does not matter 
whether or not the contract is an installment contract or a 
contract with one payment," none of the cases he cited supports 
his assertion. In Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 
(Utah 1983), the court cited the general rule of accrual, but did 
not address when a cause of action accrues for installment 
contracts. Rather, in Fredericksen, the contract arose from a 
1963 settlement in which Knight promised to periodically 
distribute profits from land sales to Fredericksen in 
reimbursement for his $10,000 investment. Id. at 35. Knight's 
obligation under the contract was triggered when it sold parcels 
of land for more than $85 per acre. Id. The court held that 
Knight clearly breached the entire contract in 1968 when it 
failed to reimburse Fredericksen the remainder of his share after 
Knight received sufficient profits that year to-fulfill the 
contract. Id. at 37. Because Fredericksen did not bring his 
suit until 1978, the entire obligation was barred by the statute 
of limitations. Id. 
At oral argument the Plaintiff asserted that Fredericksen 
5
 The Court will address the effect of the contract's 
optional acceleration clause, infra. 
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held that Knight breached the contract when it first failed to 
distribute Mr. Fredericksen's share of the profits. However, the 
Utah Supreme Court did not hold that Knight defaulted on the 
contract when it first made a profit. Rather, the court 
recognized that u[d]uring the period from 1963 through 1968," 
Knight generated sufficient profits to meet its obligations under 
the contract. Id. at 37. It then held that Fredericksen's cause 
of action accrued by 1969, when Knight certainly earned 
sufficient profits to reimburse Fredericksen. Id. 
The other cases cited by the Plaintiff are similarly 
unavailing. In Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 2005 UT App 
225, 114 P.3d 602, the court stated the general rule, and then 
considered when a cause of action accrued for breach of an 
employment contract. Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271, 
holds that a cause of action for fraud accrues when a plaintiff 
reasonably could have discovered the fraud. Although they state 
the general rule, these cases are otherwise inapplicable. 
Finally, in Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the contract arose from a settlement in which the 
defendant promised to sell land and distribute the proceeds by 
April 1976. Id. at 312. The defendant secretly sold the land 
and kept the proceeds himself. Id. The court held that the 
Anderson v. Davis PAGE 12 ORDER 
plaintiffs7 claim was barred by the statute of limitations 
because the defendant breached by failing to tender the full 
amount in 1976, and the plaintiffs had asserted their claim in 
1984. Id. at 313. Butcher did not discuss when a cause of 
action accrues for an installment contract, but dealt solely with 
obligations that ripen on a particular date. 
Because the Plaintiff has not cited any case supporting his 
argument that "it does not matter whether or not the contract is 
an installment contract or a contract with one payment," the 
Court will apply the long-standing rule that causes of action 
generally accrue for each missed installment at the time the 
obligor defaults on that obligation, but does not accrue on 
future installments until the obligations on those installments 
are individually breached. 
(iii) Acceleration Clause 
The Plaintiff points to the existence of the acceleration 
clause in the contract, and argues that because of this, there 
was a complete cause of action when Carman, LLC breached its 
obligation to pay the 1998 installments. The Plaintiff 
apparently argues that the contractual right to invoke the 
acceleration clause and demand the remainder of the installments 
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is equivalent to an accrued cause of action. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court referenced the lack of an 
acceleration clause in Moab Nat'l Bank v. Keystone-Wallace 
Resources, 517 P.2d 1020, 1021 & 1023 (Utah 1973), the Court has 
not found a Utah case that directly considers the impact of an 
optional acceleration clause upon the accrual of a cause of 
action on an installment contract. Therefore, the Court has 
considered cases from other jurisdictions that have addressed the 
issue. 
One such case is Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 930 
P.2d 1007 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). In that case, Jones and her 
husband executed a promissory note with NFCU in 1981, and agreed 
to make monthly installments of $203.54 for fifteen years. Id. 
at 1008. Jones and her husband divorced in 1983, and the husband 
agreed to pay the note in their divorce settlement. Id. In 
1989, the husband died, and Jones discovered that he was in 
arrears on the note. Id. NFCU sent a written demand for full 
payment in February 1994, and filed suit in June 1994. Id. 
Jones contended that the demand was barred by Arizona's six-year 
statute of limitations because the entire obligation was breached 
when her husband first failed to make an installment payment, 
which she asserted was before June, 1988. Id. NFCU claimed that 
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the action did not accrue until it exercised the optional 
accelerc .Ion clause by making its demand in February 1994. Id. 
at 1008-09. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals followed the majority rule that 
uthe statute of limitations runs against each installment from 
the time it becomes due, " noting that when the husband defaulted 
on a particular installment, "NFCU could have sued for the amount 
of that installment any time within the six-year limitations." 
Id. at 1009. However, it also adopted the majority rule that if 
the creditor opts to invoke the acceleration clause, then the 
statute of limitations runs as to future installments ''from the 
date the creditor exercises the acceleration clause." Id. The 
court explained that "x[i]f the acceleration clause in a debt 
payable in installments is optional, a cause of action as to 
future non-delinquent installments does not accrue until the 
creditor chooses to take advantage of the clause and accelerate 
the balance.'" Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 
153 (1987)). 
However, an acceleration clause generally does not extend 
the statute of limitations as applied to previously defaulted 
installments, "since an acceleration clause only accelerates the 
due date of future installments." Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. 
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LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 153 (1987)). The court therefore 
applied the statate of limitations to all defaulted installments 
prior to June 15, 1988, six years before NFCU filed suit, but 
allowed suit for the defaulted installments falling within the 
six years, and for the future installments demanded by NFCU. Id. 
at 1010. 
This Court is persuaded by the rule applied in Navy Federal 
Credit Union, and applies it to this case.6 One missed 
installment in the presence of an optional acceleration clause 
does not automatically start the statute of limitations for the 
remaining installments. The statute begins to run on future 
installments only if the creditor exercises the option.7 Here, 
Mr. Simmons never exercised the acceleration clause. Thus, the 
statute would not run on future installments until they came due. 
6
 Numerous other jurisdictions follow this rule. E.g., 
United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Gilmore, 698 F.2d 1096, 1097 (10th Cir. 
1983); Greene v. Bursey, 733 So.2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1999); Wall v. Citizens & Southern Bank of Houston County, 274 
S.E.2d 486, 487 (Ga. 1981); National Bank of Commerce Trust & 
Sav. Ass'n v. Ham, 592 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Neb. 1999); Buckman v. 
Hill Military Academy, 189 P.2d 575, 579 (Ore. 1948); Farmers & 
Merchants Bank v. Templeton, 646 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1982) . 
7
 This rule would not apply if the acceleration clause was 
automatic, rather than optional. See e.g., Federal Recovery of 
Washington, Inc. v. Wingfield, 986 P.2d 67, 71 (Ore. Ct. App. 
1999) . 
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(iv) Continuing Performance 
Under Navy Federal Credit Unic>\, the Defendant in this case 
would be permitted to foreclose on the property and collect the 
outstanding obligations accrued after November 1, 2000, but 
precluded from collecting against the obligations which were 
defaulted upon prior to that date. However, the payment terms of 
the Note in issue here required a June 1, 2006 payment of "the 
entire principal balance and accrued interest." 
Again, the Court has considered cases from other 
jurisdictions. In Vreede v. Koch, 380 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1989), the court held that a clause similar to the one in this 
Note runs the statute from the date the balance is due. In 
Vreede, the plaintiffs loaned $15,000 to a corporation in October 
197 8, and the defendants guaranteed the Note. The Note was to be 
repaid in installments until the principal and interest were paid 
in full. Id. at 615. The Note also provided a deadline for the 
payments, calling for "any unpaid balance, including any unpaid 
interest, [to] be due and payable" in October, 1985. Id. The 
plaintiffs filed suit in June 1987 and sought the entire balance 
and interest due under the Note. Id. The defendants answered 
that the state's three year statute of limitations governing 
guaranties barred recovery. Id. The trial court granted summary 
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judgment for the plaintiffs, and the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals affirmed. Id. 
The Vreede court noted that under the general rule of 
installment contracts, the plaintiff uwould be barred . . . from 
recovering installment payments due before 16 June 1984, three 
years before the date plaintiff filed suit," but recognized an 
exception to this general rule. Id. at 617. The court reasoned 
that the n[p]laintiff should not be penalized and barred from 
recovering the unpaid balance of the debt because plaintiff 
elected to wait to see whether defendants could fulfill their 
obligation in the future." Id. at 618. It therefore held that 
when a note contemplates the possibility of future performance, 
as when the unpaid balance and interest are due on a specific 
date, then the statute of limitations runs "^  from the time when 
the last part of the performance was due.'" Id. (quoting 18 S. 
Williston, Contracts § 2028 at 811-12 (3d ed. 1978)). 
The Court is persuaded by Vreede's policy analysis. 
Creditors should not be penalized for allowing debtors the 
opportunity to meet their obligations by an agreed date. In this 
case, the Note allowed Carman, LLC to tender complete performance 
on the Note by June 1, 2 006. Mr. Simmons's forbearance should 
not be penalized by applying the statute of limitations to the 
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date that Carman, LLC defaulted on its installments. 
The statute of limitations ' >egan to run from the date that 
the last part of Carman, LLC's performance was due, June 1, 2006. 
The Defendant filed the Notice of Default on November 1, 2006, 
well within the six-year statute of limitations. The Court 
accordingly denies the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as 
to the statute of limitations. 
B. Wrongful Lien Statute 
Because the estate of Mr. Simmons retains a valid security 
interest in the real property at issue, and Carman, LLC has 
breached its obligations, the Defendant was authorized to file 
the Notice under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (2006). Therefore, it 
was "expressly authorized" by the Utah Code, and does not fall 
within the definition of a wrongful lien. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-
1(6) (2006). 
The Court denies the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
as to his wrongful lien claim. 
C. Constructive Fraud 
The facts alleged by the Plaintiff in his first argument 
defeat his motion for summary judgment on his claim for 
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Constructive Fraud. The Plaintiff asserts, and the Defendant 
does not dispute, that w[The PlaintiffJ never signed or assumed 
any note concerning the subject property" (Verified Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Impeach Defendant's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Together with Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, at 
7) . 
The Plaintiff cites Blodgett v. Martch, 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 
1978), in support of his claim. However, Blodgett simply holds 
that a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the grantor and trust 
beneficiary. Id. at 302. In Blodgett, the court held that the 
trustee bank owed a fiduciary duty to the trustors, and that the 
bank breached that duty when it failed to explain the contents of 
the trust deed, falsely told them that they had assumed a 
secondary liability, refused to provide copies of loan documents, 
and did not disclose that their property was subject to 
foreclosure. Id. at 300-301. A substitute trustee also breached 
his duty to the trustors when he failed to comply with the notice 
statutes. Id. at 301. 
As the substitute trustee the Defendant owes a fiduciary 
duty to the Roy Simmons estate (the beneficiary) and Carman, LLC 
(the trustor). The Plaintiff has not cited any case that extends 
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the same fiduciary duties to a third party who acquires an 
interest in the encumbered property. The Plaintiff is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
To the extent that the Defendant owes a duty to the 
Plaintiff as an interest-holder in the Property, he has honored 
that duty by complying with the notice statutes governing trustee 
sales. The Court denies the Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment on his claim of constructive fraud. 
The Defendant7s Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Defendant moves the Court to grant summary judgment 
against each of the Plaintiff's claims. He treats each claim on 
the merits, and also argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing to 
assert each claim. The Court will address each argument in turn. 
A. Statute of Limitations 
The Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that "when 
contract obligations are payable by installments, the statute of 
limitations begins to run only with respect to each installment 
when it becomes due." (Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 8)(citing Nilson-Newey & Co., 905 P.2d at 316-17). 
The Defendant further argues that because the Note had 
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installment payments through June 2 006, the Note was not "due" 
until that date, and the statute of limitations began to run 
against the entire Note on that date. As discussed above, the 
Court agrees with the Defendant that the statute began to run on 
June 1, 2006, but for different reasons. 
The Defendant's argument is essentially that the statute of 
limitations does not run against an installment contract until 
the last installment is due. This argument does not comport with 
the authorities discussed, supra, however. See e.g., Buell v. 
Duchesne Mercantile Co., 231 P. 123, 124 (Utah 1924) (when 
obligations payable in installments, nthe statute of limitations 
begins to run against it from the time fixed for the payment of 
each installment for the part then payable") (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The fact that the 
Note contained obligations up until June 1, 2 006 would not extend 
the statute of limitations on previously defaulted obligations. 
Because the terms of the contract clearly required Carman, LLC to 
make monthly installments, the statute would generally begin to 
run on those installments as each came due. 
The Defendant cites Hemar Ins. Corp. of America v. Ryerson, 
200 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006), and argues that "the statute 
of limitations commences to run on an installment note on the due 
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date of the last installment." However, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals7s decision rested on a statute of limitations crafted 
specifically to govern installment contracts. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 516.100 (2000). The Missouri Supreme Court had previously 
interpreted section 516.100 in Sabine v. Leonard, 322 S.W.2d 831 
(Mo. 1959) : 
[I]n suits upon contracts where there is more than one 
item of damage (installment) the cause of action shall 
not be deemed to accrue until the last item of damage 
is sustained (last installment becomes due) so that all 
damages (installments) may be recovered and full and 
complete relief obtained in one action. 
322 S.W.2d at 838. 
In contrast, Utah's Legislature has not enacted such a 
provision for installment contracts, and Hemar Ins. Corp. of 
America is easily distinguished. In Utah, the statute simply 
states that u[a]n action may be brought within six years . . . 
upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (2006). 
As explained above, however, this Court is persuaded by the 
exception recognized by Vreede v. Koch, 380 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1989). Under Vreede, when the terms of a note require a 
debtor to tender the balance of the unpaid principal and interest 
on a specific date, the statute runs from that date. 
Therefore, in this case the statute began to run from June 
Anderson v. Davis PAGE 23 ORDER 
1, 2006. Because the Defendant filed the Notice of Default on 
November 1, 2006 - well within the six-year limitations period -
the Court grants his motion for summary judgment against the 
Plaintiff's claim that the statute of limitations prevents the 
Defendant from becoming successor trustee, and prevents his 
foreclosing on the Property. 
B. Wrongful Lien 
The Defendant argues that the Notice of Default was not a 
wrongful lien. Rather, it simply declares a default in the 
repayment obligation secured by a properly filed Trust Deed. He 
further notes that under Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102, the Plaintiff 
purchased the Property at the Sheriff's sale subject to the 
previously recorded lien. The Court agrees, and grants his 
motion for summary judgment on that claim. 
C. Slander of Title 
The Defendant also moves for summary judgment against the 
Plaintiff's slander of property title claim, arguing that the 
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to prove several 
elements of the claim, and that "a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case 
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necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Burns v. 
Cannoi. ]e Bicycle Comp., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct. ApLj. 1994). 
To prove Slander of Title, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
u
 (1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement 
disparaging [the] claimant's title, (2) the statement was false, 
(3) the statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement 
caused actual or special damages." Spencer v. Pleasant View 
City, 2003 UT App 379, S[23, 80 P.3d 546 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). "A slanderous statement is one that is 
derogatory or injurious to the legal validity of an owner's title 
or to his or her right to sell or hypothecate the property." 
Bass v. Planned Management Servs., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988). 
The Defendants correctly indicate that the Plaintiff has 
failed to allege any facts to support the first element. In his 
Complaint, the Plaintiff did not allege any facts demonstrating 
that the statement was derogatory or injurious to the legal 
validity of his title, or to his right to sell or hypothecate the 
property. The Plaintiff purchased the deed with at least 
constructive notice of the senior lien. The fact that the 
Plaintiff's Sheriff's deed is worthless is of no effect. Its 
value has not changed since he acquired it. 
Nor has the Plaintiff alleged any facts to support the 
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fourth element of special or actual damages. "Absent a specific 
monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the saleability or 
use of the property, there is no damage." Bass, 761 P.2d at 568. 
The Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the 
claim. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not respond to the 
Defendant's motion regarding this claim. Under Rule 56(e): 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against a party failing to file such a 
response. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). In this case, the Court concludes that 
summary judgment is appropriate, and enters judgment against the 
Plaintiff's slander of title claim. Judgment is warranted both 
on the merits and under Rule 56(e). 
D. Constructive Fraud 
As discussed above, the Defendant does not owe a fiduciary 
duty to an interest-holder in secured collateral. The Defendant 
holds no confidential relationship with the Plaintiff. The Court 
therefore grants the Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
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against the Plaintiff's claim for constructive fraud. 
E. Standing 
The Defendant finally asserts that all of the Plaintiff's 
claims are barred because the Plaintiff lacks standing to file a 
complaint against the successor trustee for the Trust Deed. 
Because the Court has already granted summary judgment against 
all of the Plaintiff's claims, it need not consider the 
Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert 
those claims.8 
CONCLUSION 
The Trust Deed, which secured the purchase of the Property, 
represents a purchase-money security interest. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9a-103 (2006). The Plaintiff asserts that he is a 
vendee who did not assume the contract between Carman, LLC and 
It should be noted, however, that the Defendant would be 
precluded from asserting this argument against the Plaintiff's 
first cause of action, in light of his concession that the 
Plaintiff has standing to assert the statute of limitations. 
(See Defendant R. Richard Davis' Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's 
Verified Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Impeach 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Together with Defendant's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at 5-6)("Plaintiff claims that he may have 
standing, pursuant to his interest in the subject real property, 
to file a complaint and allege a statute of limitations claim 
against a foreclosure proceeding. Defendant has not denied 
Plaintiff's standing.") (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Simmons. However, a purchaser's interest in collateral is 
only superior to a perfected purchase-money security interest if 
the buyer purchases the collateral in the ordinary course of 
business. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-320(1); id. § 70A-9a-
324(1). A purchase from a Sheriff's auction is not a purchase in 
the ordinary course of business. Therefore, if the Defendant 
forecloses on and sells the property, his greater security 
interest in the property allows him to recover the outstanding 
balance of the Note against the foreclosure proceeds. 
Because the Defendant is entitled to dispose of the Property 
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ORDER 
For the reasons discus~ed above, the Court DENIES the 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS the 
Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. The Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment disposes of the case. 
The Court immediately REMOVES the Lis Pendens on the 
Property, described as 136 East 2100 South, tax number 16-19-106-
008, also described as Lots 17 and 18, Block 1 Hollywood Tract, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff acted with substantial 
justification in placing the Lis Pendens, and therefore declines 
to impose costs and attorney fees ordinarily mandated by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(7) (2006). 
DATED this \ 4"—- day of August, 2007. 
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